Agrarian revolution in Central America : a comparison of Nicaragua and Honduras using Jeffery Paige's theory of Agrarian revolution by Toneguzzo, Eleanor.
Agrarian Revolution in Central America: A Comparison of 
Nicaragua and Honduras Using Jeffery Paige's Theory of 
Agrarian Revolution 
By 
Eleanor Toneguzzo 
Submitted in partial fulfillment 
of the requirements for the degree 
Masters of Arts 
Department of Politics 
BROCK UNIVERSITY 
St. Catharines, Ontario 
March 1987 
€) Eleanor Toneguzzo 
ABSTRACT 
In 1979 Nicaragua, under the Sandinistas, experienced a 
genuine, socialist, full scale, agrarian revolution. 
This thesis examines whether Jeffery Paige's theory of 
agrarian revolutions would have been successful in 
predicting this revolution and in predicting 
non-revolution in the neighboring country of Honduras. 
The thesis begins by setting Paige's theory in the 
tradition of radical theories of revolution. It then 
derives four propositions from Paige's theory which 
suggest the patterns of export crops, land tenure changes 
and class configurations which are necessary for an 
agrarian and socialist revolution. These propositions 
are tested against evidence from the twentieth century 
histories of economic, social and political change in 
Nicaragua and Honduras. The thesis concludes that Paige's 
theory does help to explain the occurrence of agrarian 
revolution in Nicaragua and non-revolution in Honduras. A 
fifth proposition derived from Paige's theory proved less 
useful in explaining the specific areas within Nicaragua 
that were m.ost receptive to Sandinista revolutionary 
activity. 
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Chapter One 
INTRODUCTION 
On July 17, 1979 the Sandinista Front for National 
Liberation (FSLN) overthrew Anastasio Somoza and came to 
power with widespread popular support 1n Nicaragua. This 
event is commonly called the Sandinista, or Nicaraguan, 
revolution. 1 
This revolution was a full-scale or genuine revolution 
in the sense that; it received widespread support from the 
grass roots populace and went beyond simply replacing one 
set of political rulers with another. 2 It was a popular 
and progressive revolution in the sense that it aimed to 
replace the existing social order with a more socialist 
one. Once in power the Sandinistas immediately set out 
to transform Nicaraguan society through a massive 
1 i t.eracy crusade, a popular health campaign and a land 
reform program. 3 While many other countries in recent 
1. 
decades have experienced unrest, coups and changes of 
government, few have attempted so radically to alter the 
existing state and economic system to remove the internal 
sources of instability and explo ion. 
Since full-scale popular socialist revolutions are rare, 
the Sandinista revolution in Nicaragua invit,es analysis. 
Some important questions which this thesis will attempt 
to address wi 11 include: Was t;his t;ype of revolution to 
be expected in Nicaragua? Why d it occur in the late 
1970's? Could it have been predicted on the basis of 
existing theories of revolution? 
The Limitations of Psychological and Functionalist Theories 
In my quest for an answer to these questions I examined 
various theories of revolution. 1ni tially .. I was 
impressed by Ted Gurr's theory of relative deprivation. 
I became interested in his explanat,ion of revolution 
because it was utilized in John A. Booth's comprehensive 
analysis of the Nicaraguan Revolu-tion, The End and the 
Beginning. Booth used Gurr's theory as an explanation for 
events which occurred in Nicaragua. He found Gurr" s 
theory practical because it integrated both psychological 
structural features in an att.empt to explain 
political violence. 
Gurr's theory, like others of the psychological 
tradition, 4 Is t,C) address quest.ions which are 
important for this thesis. Though his theory is not a 
theory of revolution, he purports to explain why violence 
occurs in society and in turn why some violence results 
in revolutio:nar:'l behavior. He to address the 
question of when this violence is translated specifically 
into a popular and socialist revolution. 
Despite this problem with Gurr's theory, it is utilized 
by Booth to provide insights into the Nicaraguan 
revolution. Since Booth utilizes Gurr's theory to 
explain events in Nicaragua 
to dupl icate Booth's vlOrk. 
1979, it is not necessary 
This thesis will have little 
more to say about Gurr's t.heoretical approach. 
Another author who attempts an explanation of 
revolutionary change is Chalmers Johnson. 5 While most 
proponents of the functionalist school thought tend to 
ignore revolutionary behavior he has attempted a 
conceptual clarification wl'thin which questions of ho\'? 
and why revolutions occur may be examined. 6 
Johnson's model suggests that revolutionary occurrences 
are avoidable. Like other functionalists, Johnson is 
concerned \vi th maintaining order and stabi 1 i ty. He also 
shares the view that a particular social system begins to 
experience difficulties when values 
the changes \\d:lich occur in the 
1 to account for 
ronment; or, when 
4. 
changes in values are not accompanied by changes in the 
environment. The system can return to equilibrium only 
when the values and environment are synchronized. This 
would require a new set of values or an environment 
altered through evolution or revolution. 
While Johnson's theory attempts to explain when 
revolution occurs he fails to offer an explanation or 
predict the circumstances which stimulate agrarian based 
populist, socialist revolutions. Like Gurr his theory 
fails to predict the particular t~~e of revolution 
Nicaragua experienced in 1979. Despite this shortcoming 
his theory is practical as an explanation for broad 
social change and revolution. Since Johnson's theory 
does not aim t·o answer questions which are pertinent to 
this thesis little more will be said about his t,heory as 
we examine a theory by Jeffery Paige. 
Paige's Theory of Agrarian Revolution 
The limitations inherent in both Gurr's and Johnson's 
theories led me to review other theoretical frameworks 
which attempted to predict conditions which would lead to 
popular and socialist, revolutionary change of the 
Nicaraguan 
examination 
type. This review 
of the radical 
interpretation of revolution. 
included a closer 
perspective and its 
As I considered various 
theories I became intrigued with one theory in 
particular. This theory was advanced by Jeffery Paige in 
his work Agrarian Revolution (1975). Paige's strength is 
that he attempts to combine history with a general 
predictive theory" to explain agrarian revolutions (which 
are mass-based and socialist). These agrarian 
revolutions are carefully distinguished from other forms 
of conflict and change. 
His theory begins by defining "recurring patterns of 
conflict in terms of interactions between the economic 
and political behavior of cultivators and that of 
noncultivators and predicts the circumstances under which 
these corlil icts lead to cultivator social movements in 
general and agrarian revolution in particular ... 7 His 
argument is that agrarian economies which are 
characterized by an upper class dependent on land and a 
cultivator class dependent on wages are more susceptible 
to revolutionary change. In addition Paige attributes 
exploitive local conditions to global economic demands. 
He argues that the type of landholding structure in the 
countryside is dependent on the influence of world 
markets and the particular production and marketing 
requirements of certain cash crops. 
Paige's theory represents a sharp contrast to the 
psychological and functionalist theories of revolution. 
5. 
6, 
It distinguishes among t;lpes of "revolutionary" change 
and therefore offers at. least potentially, a more precise 
explanation of the popular socialist revolution in 
Nicaragua. It also relies on structural variables in its 
explanation-- or approach to psychological variables or 
furw-tional requirements. It;. identifies specific features 
of the structure of economic and political relations 
which occur for the type of change a society 
experiences. It offers specific and t.estable 
hypotheses. These hypotheses and Paige's mod will be 
discussed in greater detail chapter two. 
is, hav-lever, pertinent t;.o no-te that Paige's theory 
provi t,he focus what are now the central questions 
T o~ this thesis. These questions lude: Does 
evidence from Nicaragua support. Paige's theory 
agrarian revolutions? Would Paige's theory 
the 
of 
have 
predicted a revolution in Nicaragua? If not, what changes 
or additions to Paige's theory might be necessary on the 
basis of the new evidence? 
The Comparative Approach 
In order to assess the utility of Paige's theory for 
understanding the Nicaraguan revolut;ion, it is helpful to 
have a comparison country which is s lar 
in many ,'1'a;)-'sto Ni caragua which has not had a 
7. 
revolution. is will to establish key differences 
in the two countries and will pinpoint those factors 
\All'li for a revo John 
St,uart Mill termed this comparative method the "me'thod of 
di 
The country I chosen is Honduras. Nicaragua and 
Honduras are similar in size, population, language 
and ethnic composition (see Table 1.1 and Figure 1.1). 
~"lhere they differ most obviously is in recent pol ical 
history. Not only has Nicaragua had a revolution, it, has 
wi tnessed decades of increasing corrupt, ion, hardship and 
violence. Guerrilla warfare by Sandinistas was met 
by Somoza' s National Guard vii th a campaign terror. 
Under the Somoza ime the peasantry was forced t.o 
contend with increased landlessness, unemployment and 
curtailment of many human 
Honduras, by contras't, has had no revolut,ion '+. l.,S 
recent decades been relatively stable ones. INhere 
the peasantry in Nicaragua experienced exploitation and 
hardship, peasantry in Honduras was vocal in 
expressing its concerns about land scarcity, unemplo;vment 
and human righ'ts violations. The Hondurans have alsc') 
been successful, beginning in the 1950's, in establish 
strong labor organizations to protect worker r 
Communal lands (ej ) have continued and the Honduran 
8. 
Table 1.1. Comparative Statistics for Nicaragua and 
Honduras. 
HONDURAS NICARAGUA 
Population (1978) 2,954,000 2,346,000 
Area in Square Km. 112,088 140,621 
% of Mestizos 90% 70% 
% of Spanish 90-95% 96% 
Speaking 
% of Roman Catholic 97% 90% 
Date of Independence October 26, 1838 September 
Figure 1.1. Map of Central America. 
15, 1838 
9, 
government has also instituted policies land reform 
whi have attempted to accommodate its peasantry, 
Ni and Honduras provide a good basis a 
comparative test of Paige's theory of agrarian 
revolution. The countries are similar in many ways but 
they differ in recent decades in terms political 
stability and revolution. If Paige's theory is sound it 
should not only be consistent with revolution 
Ni it should also be consistent with 
non-revolution in Honduras. 
Significance and Outline 
The conclusion this thesis may" have 1 policy 
implications. Revolut in Central America is very much 
oft.bE:J agenda of contemporary politics, President 
Reagan and his policymakers believe that revo ionary 
movements are the product of terrorists and international 
groups promo"ting communism. In turn, they believe that 
the way t.o contain revolution is through Olltside 
interference and military force, There are others who 
would argue that revolutions are primarily the result of 
exploitive conditions within the socie"ty itself. 8 Paige"s 
theory definitely falls into this latter category. To 
the extent that Paige is right, other theories must be 
discounted, and efforts t;o contain revolution must begin 
10. 
to look beyond military solutions to the real roots of 
exploitation in world economy and in local land 
tenure 
~t;ji th an outl ine of the main ions and a brief 
description the implication of Paige's study now 
before us, the next chapter examines the radical 
i tion theories about, revolution and explores 
Paige" s t:.heory lD more detai 1. This chapter also 
outlines five propos ions derived from Paige's theory 
which form the 
chapters. 
focus for investigation in later 
Chapter three examines l'.:Jicaragua's pre-revoltitionary 
economy to see if it corresponds to Paige's predictions. 
It discusses the major v"hich have dominated 
Nicaragua's economy since 1900 as well as the land tenure 
system which has resulted from -I::-he dominant 
patterns. 
Chapter analyzes t,he economy Honduras. It 
considers the patterns which have evolved since 
early 1900' s and the land--tenure system which has 
ensued. 
The final chapter this thesis returns to the 
propositions outlined in chapter two and evaluates 
utility of Paige's theory expl ing revolution in 
Nicaragua and non-revolution in Honduras. 
11 .. 
Chapter Two 
PAIGE'S THEORY AND THE RADICAL TRADITION 
This cl'-.lap"ter vii 11 reviev. the radical tradition of 
theory in detail by considering various 
have contributed knowledge and insight to 
topic of revolutionary change. In this 
theor i sts v.ho 
the overall 
context the 
chapter will review Paige's theory and demonstrate both 
how it is linked to past theories and how it is an 
improvement over previous models which focused on such 
variables as the market economy and land·-tenure 
patterns. This chapter will conclude with an outline of 
five propos ions which are drawn from Paige's central 
argument that the combination of non-cultivators 
dependent on land and cultivators dependent on wages is 
most volatile 
propositions will 
and can 
provide 
lead 
the 
to revolution. These 
basis for testing the 
adequacy of Paige's theory in explaining the successful 
revolution in Nicaragua in 1979. 
Karl Narx 
Karl Marx is perhaps the most important source of 
inspiration for revolutionary theory. Though many 
discard Marx's assumptions, his work continues to be 
pertinent today because his theory was not a "general 
theory of revolution relevant to all kinds of societies 
at all times ... 1 Instead "Marx regarded revolutions as 
specific to certain historical circumstances and to 
certain types of societies ... 2 Though Marx's theory has 
been revised and some of his original assumptions have 
been proven incorrect, many of his original ideas 
continue to be linked to the causes of revolution. 
Recent proponents of the Marxist approach disagree with 
Marx's notion that revolutions should occur where the 
mode of production is more economically developed. They 
argue that "revolutions occur specifically in agrarian 
states situated 
developing world 
however, rests 
in disadvantaged 
capitalism ... 3 Marx's 
on the assumption 
positions within 
original theory, 
that economic 
contradictions develop "between the social forces and the 
social relations of production. ,,4 
class conflict between the 
This in turn generates 
class which owns the 
instruments of production and rules, and the class which 
12. 
is ruled and exploited. The exploited class is forced to 
sell its labor power and becomes alienated from the 
social structure. Eventually this class develops class 
consciousness or an awareness of the exploitation 
inherent in the existing structure of society. and it 
struggles for revolutionary change. Contemporary 
Marxists agree with Marx that revolutionary 
contradictions are generated within a society, but they 
dispute his argument that the struggles of the 
bourgeoisie or proletariat have the most impact. As 
Theda Skocpol and others contend, it has actually been 
the peasantry struggling against formerly 
dominant landed classes (and\or colonial or 
neo-colonial regimes) that has done the 
most--specifically in social revolutions from 
below--to undermine the class and political 
structures of old regimes and clear the way for 
the consolidation of revolutionary statgs on a 
new socio-economic and political basis. 
Neo-marxists also dispute Marx's notion that it is 
primarily economic contradictions which explain the 
emergence of revolutionary situations. Instead they 
argue that 
the objective contradictions within the old 
regimes that explain the emergence of 
revolutionary situations have not been 
primarily economic. Rather they have been 
political contradictions centered in the 
structure and situation of states caught in 
cross-pressures between, on the one hand, 
military competitors on the international scene 
and, on the other hand, the constraints of the 
13. 
existing domestic economy and (in some cases) 
resistance by internal politically powerful 
class forces to efforts by the state to 
mobilize rgsources to meet international 
competition. 
14. 
This view that the international world-system is also 
an important variable to consider when looking at 
revolutionary situations has been referred to in the 
literature as the world-systems perspective. 
World Systems Perspective 
This perspective developed in opposition to the 
modernization theories of the 1950's and 1960's. The 
premise behind this approach is that 
... a nation state is part of a larger 
structure or organization which works to the 
advantage of some and not others . Each 
nation state therefore cannot be studied as an 
independent unit but only as a part of a larger 
whole.'f 
This approach focuses on transnational relations and 
seeks to explain the emergence of revolutionary movements 
as being in part caused by the uneven spread of 
capitalist economic development. Theda Skocpol in her 
work States and Social Revolutions emphasizes the 
importance of considering the international and world 
historical contexts when discussing revolutionary 
movements. She notes that "if a structural perspective 
means a focus on relationships, this must include 
'transnational relations as well as relations among 
differently situa'ted groups with given countries. 
Transnational relations have contributed to the emergence 
of all sooial-revolutionary orises and have invariably 
helped to shape revolutionary struggles and outoomes. ,,8 
This is also a recurring theme in Daniel Chirot's work 
Social Change in the Twentieth Century. Nationalist 
movements in peripheral and semi-peripheral societies,,9 
according to Chirot, are aimed at "catching up to the 
is to 
The aim of intellectuals leading these revolutions 
raise their own societies to a higher level 
in the world system so that they no longer 
suffer the economio and emotio~81 consequences 
of being subjected peripherals. 
Theda Skoopol and Ellen Trimberger take this point 
further and suggest that international pressures have 
been more effective in determining the outoomes of 
revolutions than intranational pressures for equality,11 
They agree with Daniel Chirot that revolutionary leaders 
have sought to enhanoe national standing and have seen 
the state apparatus as the most important tool to achieve 
"this, especially where the state could be used to guide 
or undertake national industrialization. Consequently, 
this raises an important question: is it necessary for a 
society t,o be located. in a particular position in the 
world system in order for revolutionary change to be 
successful? 
To come to some conclusions it is necessary to consider 
Daniel Chirot's model of peripheral and semi-peripheral 
societies. In his discussion of semi-peripheral 
societies he stresses that the workers and the peasants 
are somewhat better organized and on the whole more 
conscious of their interests. In peripheral societies 
underdevelopment creates conditions which keep peasants 
and workers unorganized and docile. This is because the 
populace in peripheral societies has not yet formed an 
allegiance to a single culture. Core groups are able to 
pit different groups against each other. As long as 
these groups clash with each other they will not organize 
and become a potential revolutionary force. 12 
In semi-peripheral societies, the elite and the middle 
classes control powerful state structures and their 
nationalist goals are directed toward strengthening their 
society's international position. In contrast, 
peripheral societies are economically mal integrated, and 
their economies are dependent on the export of a few 
valuable resources. This makes them vulnerable to the 
changes which occur 
fluctuations begin to 
in the 
affect 
world economy. If price 
the cash crops or resource 
exports, then massive unemployment and a decrease in 
16. 
wages for the masses of wage laborers results. In 
addition, their mal integrated economies create a 
situation where certain parts of the society (the export 
sector) interact more with the core portions of the world 
economy than with their own hinterlands. This is because 
the specialized sectors have well developed 
transportation networks that carry these products to 
ports, and government structures that maintain the social 
order and administrative machinery needed by the export 
sector to maintain trade relations with the core. Other 
sectors of the economy, however, remain underdeveloped. 
Foreign investors are 
state's balanced 
not particularly 
development. Rather 
interested in a 
they develop 
whatever areas of a state seem most likely to generate 
profitable exports. This leaves the hinterland areas in 
a relatively disadvantaged position and produces within 
these societies mutually antagonistic interests. The 
hinterland areas have little or no contact with the core 
economies and they remain culturally and economically 
backward. The export sector becomes more industrialized 
and developed and the wage laborers and professional 
people in this sector begin to adopt western ideologies 
and principles. The inhabitants of the hinterland areas 
are not so willing to forgo old traditions and accept 
modern ideas. This exacerbates antagonistic interests 
17. 
18. 
which creates a class structure which foreig:n interests 
can manipulate. 
These internal characteristics of peripheral and 
semi-peripheral societies as outlined by Daniel Chirot 
seem to suggest that the potential for revolutionary 
change rests primari ly vi'i th a society whose status in the 
world system is semi-peripheral. It must be stress 
however. that semi-peripheral status is not the sole 
determinent of revolut,ionary change. Many societies 
which reach semi·-peripheral status do not necessarily 
experience a revolution. The model outlined by Chirot is 
general and does not specify the more particular internal 
conditions which are requisite for a revolution t,o 
occur. 
The Market Economy and the Middle Peasant Theory 
Another theme in the literature is the contributing 
foroe of the market economy to revolutionary change. 
Eric Wolf in Peasant Wars of the Twentieth Century notes 
that 
Capi·talism surely did not invent 
exploitation. Everywhere it spread in the 
world, encountered soci and cultural 
systems already long dependent:, upon the fruits 
of peasant. 1 Nor can it, be supposed that 
the peasantry did not. revolt repeatedly against 
t~he transfer of its surpluses to superior power 
holders; the historical record is replete with 
peasant rebellions. It is significant, 
however, that before the advent of capitalism 
and the new economic order based on it, social 
equilibrium depended in both the long and short 
run on a balance of transfers of peasant 
surpluses to the rulers and t,he provision of a 
minimal security for the cultivator. Sharing 
of resources within communal organizations and 
reliance on ties with powerful patrons were 
recurrent ways in which peasants strove to 
reduce risks and to improve their stability, 
and both were condoned and frequently supported 
by the state . Where previously market 
behavior had been subsidiary to the existential 
problems of subsistence, now existence and its 
problems 13became subsidiary to marketing 
behavior. 
The market economy, according to Wolf, exerted 
far-reaching effects on both the peasantry and the 
agricultural laborers. Its penetration into traditional 
agrarian social systems meant a sharp break with what had 
previously been a pattern of subsistence cultivation. 
Wolf contends that the growth of the market had the most 
profound effect on the middle peasant. Unlike the poorer 
peasant the middle peasant owned property and had his own 
independent economic base. This made him vulnerable to 
land expropriations, high interest rates and price 
fluctuations which were introduced by the infiltration of 
the market economy. These were contributing forces to 
increasing his revolutionary behavior since they 
threatened his economic stability. Wolf also contends 
that 
the poor peasant or landless laborer, in 
going to the city or factory, also usually cuts 
19. 
his tie with the land. The middle peasant, 
however, stays on the land and sends his 
children to work town; he is caught in a 
s ion in "lhioh one part of the family 
retains a footing agrioulture, while the 
other undergoes the 'training of the cities', 
(Germaine Tillion) This makes the middle 
peasant a transmitter also of urban unrest and 
political ideas. The point bears elaboration, 
It is probably not so much the growth of an 
industrial proletariat as such which produces 
revolutionary activity, as the development of 
an industrial work force still closely geared 
to life in the llages. 14 
Wolf's middle peasant thesis does not stand alone in 
the 1 i terature. His argument that the middle peasant is 
a potent~ial revolutionary force has been advanced by 
Barrington Moore Jr. in Social Origins of Dictatorship 
and Democracy. Moore refers to this strat,urn of peasant.s 
as the 'upper crust of the peasantry-'. He argues that 
one of the greatest dangers for an ancien 
regime during the earliest phases of transition 
to the world of commerce and industry is to 
lose the support the upper crust of the 
peasantry. One common explanation is a 
psychological one, to the effect that limited 
improvement in the economic pos i tion of -this 
stratum leads to greater and greater demands 
and eVentually to a revolutionary outbreak. 
This notion of a "revolution of rising 
expectations" may haVe some explanatory power. 
It will not do as a general explanation. For 
both R.ussia and China, even in the twentieth 
century. it strains the evidenCe beyond 
recognition. There are SeVeral different. ways 
in which the richer peasants may turn upon the 
old order, depending on specific historical 
circumstances and the impact of these on 
different forms of peasant society. 15 
Both Moore and ~'Volf in stressing the role of the 
• middle peasant' or the 'upper crust. of the peasantry' 
fail to describe 
accuracy. v\folf, for 
this stratum with 
example, speaks 
any degree of 
of the middle 
peasant as having access to land, being conservative and 
the bearer of peasant tradition. vulnerable to economic 
changes, and not being able to withstand the ravages of 
tax collectors or landlords. To test his theory would be 
somewhat difficult since some of the indicators which 
Wolf uses to describe the middle peasant could also 
characterize poor peasants and landless laborers. This 
is also true of Moore's theory. The indicators he uses 
are far too general and provide little opportunity for 
testing. 
In addition, Wolf and Moore fail to supply an adequate 
description of the circumstances which will lead the 
middle peasants to becoming a revolutionary force. Both 
suggest that the spread of capitalism contributes to 
their revolutionary behavior, but they do not adequately 
describe the exact nature of capitalism which makes some 
middle peasants revolutionary and others not. This is a 
major shortcoming because there are many societies in 
which capitalism has spread and in which middle peasants 
have not supported revolutionary change. In specific 
cases where revolution did occur there must have been 
other internal exploitive conditions present. This 
suggests that a theory of revolution must point to more 
21. 
22. 
specific conditions than e identified by Wolf and 
Moore. 
In their theories Wolf and Moore stress the 
significance of the market economy. This is a recurring 
theme in the literature. Maurice Zeitlin in his classic 
study of the Cuban Revolution, Revolutionary Politics and 
the Cuban Working Class, also stresses the importance of 
market penetration in determining vlhether revolut.ionary 
change will occur. He contends that in countries where 
market penetration has not been extensive and the 
pre-industrial hacienda economy has been allowed to 
prevail, revolutionary change has not occurred. Zeitlin 
notes that in t.he case of Cuba) the peasantry was 
integrated into a plantation, sharecropper and wage--labor 
economy. They were "not shielded, as was generally true 
of the pre-revolutionary Mexican and Bolivian peasantry .. 
for instance, from the forces of the market economy, nor 
",'ere they integrated into a traditional communal social 
structure. ,,16 
Zei t~l in's theory begins to make a connection between 
market penetration and the type of land tenure system. 
His theory is not unique in the 1 it,erature. Arthur T .u • 
Stinchcombe attempted to make this connection as early as 
1961. Stinchcombe's theory suggested tha-t each type of 
property system produces a distinctive pattern class 
relations. He defines five types of property systems: 
the manorial or hacienda system, the family-size tenancy, 
the family smallholding, plantation agriculture, and the 
ranch, which is capitalist extensive agriculture with 
wage labor. 
The hacienda economy is perhaps the m.ost stable of the 
five types of land tenure systems. Stinchcombe describes 
it as precommercial agriculture with 
cultivation of small plots for subsistence by 
a peasantry, combined with cultivation by 
customary labor dues of domain land under the 
lord's supervision. It fairly often happens 
that the domain land comes to be used for 
commercial crops, while the peasant land 
continues 19 be used for subsistence 
agriculture. 
This system does not include a rural labor market; 
instead labor dues or rents are based on customary law or 
force. The relative stability of this system continues 
until the value of labor or land becomes great. As long 
as managers of agricultural enterprises fail to calculate 
the efficiency of wage labor, the hacienda economy 
continues. The farther the market penetrates the 
hacienda economy, the more likely land will become an 
article of commerce. Landowners will notice that the 
traditional level of income becomes insufficient to 
compete for prestige with the bourgeoisie and they set 
about trying to raise incomes by increasing 
2.3. 
productivity, is When this occurs the 
price and productivity of land goes up, 
tenancy by family farmers provides the lord 
with a comfortable income that can be spent in 
the capital city, without much worry about the 
management of crops. The farther the market 
penetrates agriculture, first creating a market 
for commodities, then for labor and land, -the 
more economically unstable does the manorial 
economy become, and the more likely is the 
manor to go over to one of the other types of 
agricultural enterprise. 19 
Stinchcombe, like Zeitlin, contends that revolution in 
a hacienda economy is very unlikely, The market has 
little effect on the population and the peasantry has 
neither the interest in political issues nor the 
experience to organize and confront the upper class. 
The second type of land tenure system, the family-size 
tenancy, is characterized by: 
(a) land having a very high productivity and 
high market price; (b) the crop is highly 
labor-intensive, and mechanization of 
agriculture is little developed; (c) labor is 
cheap; (d) there are no appreciable economies 
of scale in factors other than labor; and (e) 
the period of production of the crop is one 
year or less. 2U 
These conditions Stinchcombe suggests are most fully 
met vii th crops such as rice and cotton. He also stresses 
that these systems are politically unstable and conflicts 
arise because of several factors. For example "the lower 
the rent of the rentier capitalist, the higher the income 
of the peasantry. The division of the product at harvest 
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time or at the time of sale is a clear measure of the 
relative prerogatives of the farmer and the rentier ... 21 
Second, Stinchcombe stresses the risk which the peasantry 
is forced to take. Rentiers who invest in land shift as 
much of the risk of failure as possible to the tenant. 
Whether the rent is share or cash, the 
variability of income of the peasantry is 
almost never less, and is often more, than the 
variability of rentiers' income. This makes 
the income of the peasantry highly variable, 
contributing to their political 
sensitization. 22 
In addition, Stinchcombe suggests that political 
radicalization is prevalent in this system because "the 
leaders of the rural community, the rich peasants, are 
not vulnerable to expulsion by the landowners, as they 
would be were the landowners also the local 
government. ,,23 The rich peasant "shares at least some of 
the hardships and is opposed in his class interests to 
many of the same people as are the tenants ... 24 Like Wolf 
and Moore, Stinchcombe stresses the importance of the 
'middle peasant' as the carrier of revolutionary 
potential. In the tenancy system, these more prosperous 
peasants see the rentier class as blocking their 
opportunity for upward mobility. Since they are "members 
of the village community they often form a class of 
natural leaders within the village against the urban 
landlords. ,,25 
2.5. 
The third type of property system Stinchcombe discusses 
is the family smallholding. It differs from the family 
tenancy system in that the enterprise is more 
concentrated in the class of farmers. Likewise labor in 
this system is free, the land does not cost rent and 
there is no advantage to leaving it uncultivated. The 
smallholder, however, is directly affected by market 
influences; his income varies according to the market 
price of the commodities he produces. Smallholder 
political movements tend to be aimed at maintaining the 
price of agricultural commodities. They also tend to be 
opposed to creditors who make credit expensive and 
burdensome in years of bad harvests. 
The fourth type of land tenure system Stinchcombe 
describes is the plantation. Such systems 'tend to be 
concentrated where crops such as coffee, tree fruit and 
rubber exist. A key requirement is long-term capital 
investment in the crop combined with a relatively low 
cost of land. The enterprise is characterized by 
a small highly skilled and privileged group 
which administers the capital investment, the 
labor force, and the marketing of the crops 
with a large group of unskilled, poorly paid, 
and legally underprivileged workers. Quite 
generally, the workers are ethnically distinct 
from the skilled core of administrators, often 
being imported from economically more backward 
areas or recruited from an economically 
backward native population in colonial and 
semicolonial areas. This means that ordinarily 
26. 
they are ineligible for the urban labor market 
of the nation in which they work, if it has an 
urban labor market. GO 
27. 
In short, Stinchcombe suggests the plantation system 
perpetuates "a poverty of associational life" for the 
agricultural laborer. In most instances. laborers fail to 
participate in local government, lack education and are 
highly vulnerable to oppression by landlords and 
landlord-dominated governments. According to 
Stinchcombe, revolution under these circumstances occurs 
only when the agricultural class is mobilized by urban 
intellectuals. 
The last system Stinchcombe outlines is the ranch. 
This form of land tenure is found where wool and beef are 
the dominant commodities. "The characteristic social 
feature of these enterprises is a free-floating, mobile 
labor force, often with few family ties, living in 
barracks, and fed in some mess hall. They tend to make 
up a socially undisciplined element, hard-drinking and 
brawling. ,,27 In this enterprise there is virtually no 
pressure to keep the labor force oppressed because the 
cost of production is low. Therefore, there exists 
little potential for organization and radicalism among 
the laborers. 
Stinchcombe's theory is interesting because he begins 
with land tenure systems and suggests they produce a 
distinctive pattern of class relations. His typology 
considers the family-size tenancy system most volatile 
and susceptible to revolutionary change. His theory 
faced by the 'middle emphsizes the structural 
peasant' 28 since the 
problems 
rentier capitalist blocks his 
mobility. Stinchcombe's opportunity for upward 
description of the middle peasant, however, lacks 
precision and accuracy. Like the theories propounded by 
Wolf and Moore, the indicators for Stinchcombe's middle 
peasant are very general. According to his typology. the 
plantation economy also provides the potential for 
revolutionary organization. 
many plantation systems 
multinational corporations, 
He fails to 
are owned 
consider 
and run 
instead of landlords. 
that 
by 
In 
these types of enterprises) unions often exist and they 
provide the worker with bargaining power. This results 
in a more disciplined labor force which becomes 
disinterested in revolutionary objectives. 29 
Though Stinchcombe's theory has some inherent problems, 
I have described it in greater detail than the other 
middle peasant theories because of his concentration on 
land tenure systems. Stinchcombe's theory must be given 
due recognition because it was the first theory to 
suggest that property systems produce distinctive 
patterns of class relations. Many of his original ideas 
have been carried over and elaborated in Jeffery Paige's 
more recent model of agrarian revolution. 30 
Jeffery Paige~s Theory of Agrarian Revolution 
According to Jeffery Paige) there are four basic types 
of agrarian landholding structures.. only one of which is 
likely to lead to revolution. Paige derives this 
typology by distinguishing between cultivators and 
non-cultivators and then by distinguishing how each group 
support,s elf. The four square model, which is 
outlined on the following page, seeks to simplify Paige" s 
theory. It suggests that non-cultivators depend 
primarily on either land or capital and cultivators 
depend on either wages or land. The combination of 
non-cuI t.ivators dependent on land and cultivators 
dependent on wages is the most volatile. This is 
represented by a sharecropping structure or migratory 
labor estates. In the sharecropping st,ructure J the 
landlord finds it impossible to increase his income 
except by extracting more from the peasantry, which in 
turn leads the peasantry to revolution. In the case of 
migratory labor estates) e migratory laborer continues 
subsistence agriculture until changes occur in the export 
economy. If cash crops for export are developed and 
Figure 2.1. Paige's Typology of Agrarian Landholding 
Structures and Revolutionary Political 
Movements, 
CULTIVATORS 
LAND WAGES 
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Source:Jeffery M. Paige, Agrarian Revolution. Social 
Movements and Export Agriculture in the 
Underdeveloped World (New York: The Free Press, 
1975), p. 11. 
there is a demand for land, small farmers and part-time 
migratory laborers are forced to leave their subsistence 
plots and become landless wage-laborers. This creates an 
insecure landless wage-labor force which cannot find 
full-time employment because cash crops demand labor only 
during harvest season which is three to four months per 
year. While both sharecropping and migratory labor 
estates lead to revolutionary uprisings there is a 
difference in revolutionary objectives. "In t,he 
sharecropping system the dominant ideology is likely to 
be communist while in migratory labor systems the 
dominant ideology is likely to be nationalist ... 31 In each 
J1. 
of t,he other agrarian structures, which include the 
hacienda, the smallholding, and the plantation, the 
non-cultivators can meet the pressures for change and 
increase their income without squeezing cultivators to 
the point of revolution. Cultivator movements will exist 
in each of these other structures but they will be 
directed at than revolution. 
Revolution is 
more specific goals 
only possible, says Paige, where 
sharecropping or migratory labor estates are the dominant 
land tenure pattern. The specific type of landholding 
structure, according to Paige. is influenced by the 
extent of market penetration. What determines market, 
influence is the cash crops available in specific 
countries and their demand in the world economy. The 
marketing and produc"tion requirements of these cash crops 
are also instrumental in determining the type of land 
tenure system which will ensue. This point will be 
discussed in greater detail in subsequent chapters. 
tl§!9.i§msl§: : 
grown, the 
l§!ng §!ng l~ng. Where 
landholding structure 
cash crops are not 
remains typically 
preindustrial and the hacienda economy continues to 
prevail. This type of land-tenure system according to 
Paige's model is not predisposed to revolution because 
both the cul t,i vators and the non-cul ti vators draw their 
income from the land. In addition the upper class 
confronts a politically apathetic and disenfranchised 
peasantry. If change is to occur it depends on the 
weakening of the repressive power of the landed 
aristocracy. It also requires a party or group from 
outside the community to provide the organizat,ional 
st.rength. ~'\Ihen these two fact.ors are present a revolt 
may occur.. but it is aimed at seizing -che estates and 
redistributing property. Once land is seized the 
peasantry rapidly loses interest in political issues. 
They lack the organization for long run political 
objectives such as seizing state power. 
An example of a country where a hacienda economy 
experienced a revolt is Mexico in 1910. It has been 
referred to as a revolution by many noted authors 
including Daniel Chi rot, but the transformation did not 
go beyond land reform. Chi rot suggests that had there 
been a peasant-intellectual alliance then the revolution 
would have been more complet.e. He blames the peasant 
leadership for the moderate reforms which occurred. 
Jeffery Paige instead would argue that the hacienda 
economy could no·t experience a revolution.. only a revolt 
since peasants continue to be tied to the land and they 
are only concerned about 
cultivation. 32 
maintaining subsistence 
Qm~ll tlQl~ing: £~Eii~l ~n~ 1~n4· In the case of the 
32. 
small holding economy, Paige suggests that 1Nhere the 
cultivating class is dependent on land as its source of 
income and the upper class is dependent on commercial 
capital there is little possibility of a revolutionary 
movement, Small holding farmers are tied to t:.he land and 
are suspicious of parties threatening to abolish private 
farmer finds his income properties. If the small 
decreasing because of the extractions of middlemen he may 
be inclined to support political movements which restrict 
the actions of middlemen. Such movements may be called 
reformist commodity movements; they focus on control of 
the market in agricultural commodities. 
!,::§:g~§.. The plantation and the 
small holding economies share the common characteristic 
of an upper class which draws its income from commercial 
or industrial capital and has t:;he capabi I i ty to increase 
production through capital investment and therefore 
expand the sum of agricultural income to be shared with 
cultivators. For this reason a compromise can be reached 
in economic conflicts. This type of structure is usually 
found where crops have a continuous or a near continuous 
harvesting 
reduction. 
sugar, tea, 
period and undergo substantial bulk 
Typical examples of such crops include sisal, 
palm oil, rubber, coconuts and bananas. 
These crops require processing machinery and create 
33. 
economies of scale by distributing the cost of processing 
equipment over many un \/ij'here conflicts occur in this 
syst,em they usually focus on income from property rat·her 
than ovmersh ip. Cultivator movements and demands are 
limited to questions of wages and working conditions and 
·the upper class has the resources to make concessions and 
usually does. 
Qh,§,!:§:9J2QJ2.E.im~. 
Paige's typology 
Mig!:~tQ!:~ L'§'~Q£: l~rr~ 
includes two different types of 
agricultural structures which have a landed upper class 
and a working class which is dependent on wage labor; the 
migratory labor estate and sharecropping. The migratory 
labor estate is usually found where crops demand a 
relatively short harvest period of 2-4 months. It is 
concentrated in crops such as coffee and grapes where no 
expensive machinery is required. Paige suggests that 
revolution is not likely to occur if migratory laborers 
spend much of their time in traditional subsistence 
agriculture and migrate to work on the estates only 
during the harvest periods. It is worth noting that 
while t,he upper classes of the migratory estate behave 
similarly to the upper classes dependent on landed 
property, the migratory wage labor force does not exibit 
the same characteristics as the agricultural working 
class which is dependent on wage labor. The migratory 
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laborer is less interested in political action because he 
can always return to subsistence production if estate 
labor is unreliable. Since 
he returns to a subsistence community, he is 
subject to the same individualistic competitive 
pressures and hopes for individual mobility 
that characterize the subsistence peasant. The 
longer he remains in the subsistence milieu, 
the more his political behavior resembles that 
of a member of an agricultural working class 
dependent on lag§--·conservati ve, apathetic and 
badly organized. " 
It is however different, when the migratory laborers 
face massive land expropriations and traditional 
subsistence agriculture is threatened. ~'\Iith the 
introduction of new cash crops many peasants and 
m.igratory laborers are forced ,to leave t,heir small farms 
and depend on full time employm.ent in cash cropping 
agriculture. Migratory laborers will participat,e in a 
nationalist~ revolution when subsistence agriculture is 
threatened and an inflexible elite exists which is 
dependent on force rather than economic power. 
While many migratory estate economies create a 
politically apathetic workforce, those which exist in 
colonial areas have been subjec't to violent revolutionary 
movements. 34 This occurs 
".,hen the landed estates are developed by 
settlers who threaten the continued political 
survival of the traditional agrarian leadership 
by the expansion of their estates. The 
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organizational framework of t,he traditional 
subsistence community, then, may provide the 
organization that the workers lack. It is an 
organization based on the economics of 
subsistence production rather than specifically 
directed at political ends, but it can provide 
the same organizational coherence as a 
political party or an economic organization. 35 
The ideology which unites these two groups, the 
migratory laborers and the traditional elite, is not 
based on class but. is based on a national or racial 
hatred of the settler class. Jeffery Paige cites the 
example of Kenya and the Mau Mau revolution as fu~ example 
of migratory labor estates where a violent revolutionary 
movement occured. 
Results are similar in a sharecropping economy where 
the traditional upper class has become the new landed 
elite in the export economy. The cultivator class has 
lost its traditional rights to the land and the "economic 
characteristics of the 1 lord in the sharecropping 
system lead to the now familiar pattern of intractable 
zero-sum conflict over landed property ... 36 The 
decentralized estate system within sharecropping. in 
",hich the peasantry is landless and the upper class IS 
weak, creates the sufficient cond ions for communist 
revolution. In such an agrarian structure land has a 
high market value and the crops are highly 
labor-intensive. For this reason there is nothing 
further to be gained from the process at the point of 
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production. The landed estate owner has few alternatives 
available to increase his wealth since technological 
innovations are beyond his resources. One of his options 
includes squeezing the peasantry further; if the 
sharecropper attempts to make improvements on his land, 
his rent is raised and thus his economic gains and 
mobility are restricted. Since the agricultural 
class can manipulate the political system to 
upper 
gain 
economic advantages, they 
structure where sharecroppers 
perpetuate an 
have virtually 
agrarian 
no legal 
rights to the land and are subject to the extractions of 
middlemen and moneylenders. In short, according to 
Paige, sharecropping economies "combine an upper class 
dependent on land rather than capital and a lower class 
dependent 
political 
on wages rather than land 
conditions necessary 
which 
for 
create the 
communist 
revolution. " 37 
The Propositions To Be Tested 
At this point)we can return to the central problem of 
this thesis: does Paige's theory of agrarian revolution 
help us to understand the Sandinista revolution in 
Nicaragua and the difference between 
Honduras? If Paige's theory is correct, 
have had a sharecropping economy by 
Nicaragua and 
Nicaragua should 
the 1970's and 
Honduras should have had some other form. There should 
also be evidence that Nicaragua was developing a 
sharecropping or migratory labor economy in the decades 
prior to the 1970's: otherwise Paige's theory would not 
explain why a revolution did not occur earlier. 
To be more specific, if Paige's theory is correct, all 
or most of the following conditions and changes should be 
evident in Nicaragua between 1950 and 1975. Conversely 
these conditions and changes should be absent from 
Honduras. These conditions and changes include: 
(1) A significant change in the export sector 
which results in land having a very high rate 
of productivity and a high market price. This 
change in the export economy results in the 
upper class becoming increasingly dependent on 
land. 
(2) The change in the export sector also 
results in an increasing shift to a 
sharecropper economy or migratory estates based 
on rice, coffee, grapes, cotton (cotton is 
discussed in more detail below) or other 
commodities which are highly labor-intensive 
and which have a period of production of one 
year or less and a short harvest period of two 
to four months duration. 
(3) A peasantry increasingly stripped of its 
land and forced to assume the role of wage 
laborer. either as a sharecropper or migratory 
laborer. 
(4) An economically weak upper class 
unwilling to grant any political or economic 
concessions and dependent on legal or 
extralegal force for its economic survival 
)8. 
An additional proposition which is relevant for a 
comparison of regions within Nicaragua is: 
(5) Greater support for the Sandinistas where 
sharecropping or migratory labor estates were 
the predominant land tenure systems. 
A further elaboration of these propositions is perhaps 
warranted. The first proposition is designed to test 
Paige's assertion that the process of change begins with 
the upper class responding to new urban and export 
markets, The adoption of new crops valuable in the 
export markets often result in high land values where 
cultivation ].' <"', .;;> intense and the upper class becomes 
increasingly dependent on land, which makes the 
possession of land more and more desirable. 
The second proposition is designed to test Paige's 
central argument that a decentralized sharecropping 
economy or migratory labor estate structure is more 
conducive to revolutionary change. Unlike other land 
tenure systems, sharecropping exerts intense pressures on 
the tenant sharecropper. He is in a relatively insecure 
position since he can be dismissed at any time. The 
extraction by the landlord is also high and it is 
impossible for the sharecropper to accumulate property 
because he must contend with the extractions of middlemen 
and moneylenders. Similarly, migratory laborers divested 
of land face an insecure future and are forced to migrate 
39. 
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from one area to the next to find work during the harvest 
periods of major cash crops. 
Paige believes these are significant factors but he 
also suggests that this system is usually found where 
land has a high market value, and where a high population 
density exists. To cope with the high population 
density, land must be intensively cultivated. In most 
areas of poor tropical soils, intensive cultivation can 
only be accomplished through irrigated agriculture. This 
restricts the types of agricultural products grown in 
these types of economies. Paige's analysis connects rice 
cuI ti vat, at ion specifically to sharecropping structures 
and suggests that~ rice sharecroppers in particular are 
subject to market fluctuations and indebtedness which 
leads to high rates of turnover. They clearly resemble 
landless laborers since they have few ties to the 
landlord because he is not directly involved in the 
marketing of the crop. Rice, unlike other agricultural 
commodities, is not grown in soil, but in a biotic medium 
suspended in irrigation water. 38 The migratory labor 
system is "used most frequently in perennial tree c:eops, 
particularly coffee and grapes which cannot be easily 
adapted to sharecropping. ,,39 These crops can be easily 
combined with subsistence production, and coffee is 
regularly grown as a sideline by subsistence farmers in 
~. 
many export economies. 
While Paige's study connects rice cultivation 
specifically to sharecropping economies, he suggests that 
cotton production is organized on centralized estates 
because of the weaker market influences characteristic of 
the crop. It is not as subject to price fluctuations and 
therefore a greater paternalism exists and cotton 
sharecroppers fear the loss of long term ties to the 
estate. For this reason the workforce is similar to that 
which exists on backward commercial haciendas; instead of 
exibiting the radical nature of rice sharecroppers they 
are bound to the land and therefore not open to radical 
ideas. However, it must not be assumed that this will 
necessarily be the case in Nicaragua. If a sharecropping 
or migratory estate structure based on cotton is found to 
exist in Nicaragua, it is possible that, contrary to 
Paige's study, the workforce may exibit the same radical 
tendencies as rice sharecroppers. If cotton can be tied 
to a revolutionary labor force, Nicaragua could provide 
evidence that will support a minor modification of 
Paige's model. In fact, in a more recent article Paige 
has suggested this modification himself. 40 
Proposition three is designed to test Paige's theory 
that revolutions occur where non-cultivators are 
dependent on income from land and cultivators are 
dependent on wages. This system usually results when the 
export market, is changing and a more efficient type of 
land tenure system is necessary to produce and market the 
crop. This results in the peasantry being increasingly 
stripped of its land and forc:ed to assume the role of 
wage laborer. As wage laborers they must confront a 
landed upper class unwilling to concede higher wages or 
land tenure security; this 1S because there are no 
appreciable economies of scale in sharecropping other 
than labor itself. In such systems there is nothing to 
be gained from processing at the point. of production. 
The sum of the proceeds of the enterprise is fixed. since 
nei ther landlord nor tenant has the capital or incent,i ve 
to invest in new technology. 41 
Proposition four is designed to test Paige's notion 
that the economic weakness of the upper class leads it to 
"close off all avenues of social action except violent 
resistance ... 42 In addition to being unwilling to grant 
any political or economic concessions the upper class 
must; depend on extralegal force for economic 
survi val. 
Propos ion f is designed to t~est 's 
hypothesized correlation between land -tenure systems and 
radi lSlrt,. If Paige is correct, those areas within the 
country where sharecropping or migratory estates are the 
42. 
dominant pattern 1 tenure should also be the areas 
where support for the Sandinistas began or was more 
intense. 
To adequately consider these propos ions and whether 
they indeed describe conditions in pre-revolutionary 
Nicaragua, Chapter three will attempt to analyse both the 
pre-World War II and post-World War II export economy. 
43. 
Chapter Three 
NICARAGUA 
To test Jeffery Paige's theory of revolution, specifio 
aspects of pre-revolutionary Nicaraguan society must be 
considered. The crucial variables in Paige's theory 
include the cash crops produced for export, the type of 
land tenure system whioh results, and the class 
configuration which is derived from particular modes of 
production. To ascertain whether these variables were 
indeed significant in the Nicaraguan case and ultimately 
contributed to the Sandinista revolution, it is important 
to trace the economic history of Nicaragua. This analysis 
must also attempt to answer some pertinent questions. If 
Paige's theory is correct, Nicaragua's export economy 
should have experienced a change in recent decades. If 
such a change did occur it is especially important to 
ascertain whether there were ramifications which included 
44. 
a change in the land tenure system. In addition, if the 
land tenure system weathered a radical change, how did 
this affect the peasantry? Did it result in greater 
tenure insecurity and landlessness or did the Somoza 
government recognize the potential threat of this class 
of semi-proletarianized rural peasants and institute an 
agrarian reform program? If so, how effective was this 
reformist program? To begin answering these questions it 
is important to analyse Nicaragua's export economy before 
World War II. 
The Liberal and Conservative Parties 
Nicaragua's economic structure in the 20th century has 
in part been determined by the political events of the 
19th century. Prior to 1893 Nicaragua had been 
controlled by the Conservatives and had very weak links 
to the world market. Internal production was organized 
around subsistence farming and traditional cattle 
haciendas. The Conservatives had evolved from Granada 
which had been a commercial center and a chief port for 
the trade between Central America and Spain by way of the 
San Juan River. The leading citizens of this party were 
1 anded propr i etors and merchants. Most, lived in rural 
districts and managed cattle ranches. 
By contrast, the Liberals came from Leon and favored 
modernization of the country's infrastructure, free 
trade, the breakup of Indian communal lands, the creation 
of a mobile labor force and a reduction in the power of 
the Church. The state 
was strong enough 
fought many battles 
remained weak since neither party 
to impose complete authority. They 
for power and the peasantry was 
forced to fight for regional landowners. The dominant 
feature of the 19th century was successive civil wars 
which left little time for cultivating the plantations. 
Most importantly, the inability to consolidate as a 
dominant and united bourgeoisie thwarted the development 
of a dynamic domestic bourgeoisie and ultimately became 
one of the keys to the economic crises Nicaragua faced 
throughout the 1900's. 
The Beginning of Coffee Production and U.S. Intervention 
When coffee prices began to rise in the world market a 
sector of -the Leon elite (those tied to the Liberal 
Party) slowly became a modernizing coffee bourgeoisie. 
Those tied to "che Conservat,ive Party, t.he Granada based 
elite, continued to remain predominantly tied to the 
cattle haciendas and subsistence farming. As this coffee 
bourgeoisie began to coalesce and play a more dynamic 
role in moving the country toward capitalist development, 
the landed elite and the Conservative Party were forced 
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to make changes to accommodate them. These changes 
included the expulsion of peasants that resided on lands 
which were suitable for coffee cultivation. This 
expulsion meant that previous laws had to be changed. 
The constitution of 1858 (Artiole 14) had emanoipated the 
peasants from obligatory labour. Indians were allowed to 
return to their communal lands. To extend land use for 
coffee cultivation the Agrarian Reform Law of 1877 was 
put through. It created the conditions for the free 
funotioning of the market in land. Peasants without 
title to their land were pushed aside and this law 
dissolved the ejido or communal lands. In other cases 
illegal methods were adopted to expropriate the peasants; 
these included "intimidation, terror or usurious interest 
rates of 30%-60% which resulted in the short-term 
alienation of land and the revival of forced labor ... 1 In 
1893 this new coffee bourgeoisie was also instrumental in 
J!' bringing Liberal leader Jose Santos Zelaya to power. 
Like other Liberals Zelaya was progressive. As a 
genuine labor market was slowly coming into existence, he 
sought to enhance its growth through the development of 
Nicaragua's economic and state infrastruoture. He 
encouraged the development of railways, telegraphs state 
banks and sohools. As Zelaya and the new coffee 
bourgeoisie began to move the oountry toward capitalist 
development, they began to exceed the limits the United 
States was willing to grant Nicaragua. Zelaya's political 
ambitions included commanding a new central American 
federation. To achieve this 
he fomented revolutions in all of the other 
four republics, and even in countries so far 
distant as Columbia and Ecuador, until by 1909 
the only one of his neighbors who did not hate 
and fear him was the president of Honduras, 
whom he himself had placed in 20ffice by his 
invasion of that state in 1907. 
These tactics concerned the United States, and Zelaya's 
nationalism3 led to his downfall when the U.S. became 
alarmed about rumors that Zelaya was negotiating with the 
British and Japanese to build a second canal through 
Nicaragua. In 1903 the U.S. had negotiated with Zelaya to 
build a canal across Nicaragua to link the Atlantic and 
Pacific oceans. Zelaya set certain limits on U.S. rights 
in the proposed canal zone which were unacceptable to the 
U.S., and they shifted to Panama as the site of the 
canal. When it became known that a more competitive 
canal might be built, the U.S. let it be known that it 
would favor the overthrow of Zelaya. 
In 1909 a revolt finally occurred and Zelaya's forces 
made the tactical mistake of executing two confessed U.S. 
mercenaries. This gave the U.S. the pretext to sever 
relations with Nicaragua. Zelaya held on to power as long 
as he could but he was forced to resign and was exiled. 
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Before his exile, however, he appointed the Liberal 
leader Dr. Jose Madriz to succeed him. The U.S. refused 
to recognize any Liberal government and on August 20, 
1910 the Madriz government fell and the U.S. replaced it 
with a puppet government supported by the Conservatives. 
The new government accepted the permanent presence of 
U.S. troops in the country and allowed the economy to be 
controlled by New York banks. The presence of the United 
States produced a "backward dependent capitalism where 
power rest.ed with a small bourgec1lsie whose economic 
interests coincided at the local level with U.S. designs 
for Nicaragua. ,,4 The development of a domestic 
bourgeoisie had therefore been blocked. The 
political aspira"'[.10ns of a class which might 
have jected dynamic capitalist growt.h into 
Nicaragua--expressed by t.h.e Zelaya Liberal 
government--had been shown to be by definition 
incompatible with American interests, and had 
promptly been abort.ed. Zelaya> s very 
nationalism, given U.S. intervention, only 
guaranteed the furtb.er ant i-nat i onal 
develoErnent the economy and debility ()f the 
state. 
This current view is also consistent with ervation 
at the time of U.S. intervention. In the Five Republics 
of Central America (1918), Dana G. Munro wrote: 
during the 
numr)er of 
established 
Matagalpa and 
near Managua 
last twenty-five years, however. a 
coffee plant:ations have been 
both in departments 
Jinotega and in the mountains 
and Granada. These are not so 
large nor so well equipped as those in other 
countries of the Isthmus, and their product is 
much less than that of Guatemala or Salvador, 
but their development has nevertheless greatly 
increased the commerce of the country. It has 
not, however, affected general economic and 
political conditions so much as it would have 
if the majority of the plantations were not 
owned and managed by foreigners. Nicaraguan 
citizens hold only a part of the properties in 
the South Western Sierras, and those in the 
North are almost entirely in the hands of 
Germans, Englishmen, and ~nericans. The natives 
have participated less in the prosperity due to 
the new conditions than in any of the other 
countries where cgffee has become the principal 
national product. 
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During the mid-1920's the U.S. was convinced that the 
Conservatives could rule the country without the presence 
of U.S. troops. Within a few months, however, a 
rebellion occurred and Washington was forced to intervene 
again. The third occupation (1927) saw Washington 
determined to reconcile the Liberal and Conservative 
parties and to exterminate any resistance to the United 
States. The two parties agreed to cooperate on a 
political arrangement, but one problem existed. Cesar A. 
Sandino and several other Liberal leaders resisted U.S. 
goals. As Sandino's strength and popular support 
increased, Conservative and Liberal infighting 
continued. To correct this situation the United States 
created the National Guard. It was a native, non-partisan 
force which would replace the Marines in their role of 
protectors of U.S. interests. The head of the National 
Guard would be a one-time used-car salesman named 
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Anastasio Somoza Garcia. The United States picked Somoza 
for one reason, he had no clear allegiance to either the 
Conservative or Liberal parties and was clearly allied to 
U.S. interests. 
Foreign intervention in Nicaragua strengthened the hand 
of the traditional landed oligarchy vis-a-vis the reform 
minded coffee entrepreneurs. For this reason the 
structure of coffee production lagged behind that in El 
Salvador, Costa Rica and Guatemala throughout the 20th 
century. 
The Economy of Nicaragua 1910-1950 
Coffee was the main cash crop exported 
until 
exist, 
less 
by Nicaragua 
continued to 1950. Other forms of agriculture 
such as the cattle haciendas, but they 
important. The growth of 'the coffee 
were far 
industry 
dependent introduced 
capitalism. 
into Nicaragua a primitive 
The economy was based heavily on a single 
primary export product and, more importantly, this system 
did not provide benefits for the majority of the 
population. The benefits of the system predominantly 
accrued to the domestic elite and its foreign trading 
partners. Coffee profits were not taxed by the 
government and therefore did not provide any 
redistribution of income to the majority of impoverished 
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workers. The Nicaraguan populace was forced to contend 
with periods of boom and bust typical of this type of 
coffee republic. The government made little effort to 
see that the economy moved toward national development. 
If we consider Jeffery Paige's theory at this point, it 
is important to ascertain whether the export of coffee 
produced a significant change in the land tenure system. 
From the discussion thus far it is apparent that the 
advent of coffee production introduced changes which 
included the free functioning of a wage labor economy. 
However, a more pertinent question is how extensive were 
the changes? Did they affect the peasantry throughout 
Nicaragua, or was coffee production limited to certain 
areas? In addition, it is equally important to describe 
the characteristics of this commodity. Was coffee 
production organized in a system where the upper class 
was dependent on land and the lower class was dependent 
on wages, which typically describes a sharecropping 
system? 
The Process of Coffee Cultivation 
Two factors are crucial 
in 
in the process of coffee 
the right climatological 
unskilled workforce. When 
cultivation: fertile land 
setting and an available 
coffee production began in Nicaragua many of the 
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exploitable lands were held by peasants and members of 
Indian communes. The Agrarian Reform Law of 1877 
produced the conditions for the free functioning of the 
market in land and the introduction of wage labor. 
Coffee production also required considerable sums of 
money to be spent on machinery. For this reason most of 
those who wen-t into this new enterprise were large 
landholders, prosperous commercial speculators, and 
foreigners. 7 To encourage the growth of coffee, Subsidy 
Laws were passed in 1879 and 1889 which "gave planters of 
all nationalities cultivating more than five thousand 
trees a subsidy of five cents per tree",8 This resulted 
in many foreign colonists coming to invest in Nicaragua's 
central highlands. 
Coffee, unlike many other commodities, has a relatively 
short harvest period. Though many peasants had their 
land expropriated to make way for the new agro-export 
economy geared to coffee, coffee itself did not include 
an annual planting season. Additional amounts of labor 
were not required after the harvest months of November to 
February, For this reason some peasants chose to flee 
from the new coffee zones and turned to subsistence 
farming on lands which were not coveted by the landed 
elite for coffee production. Other peasants chose to 
stay on the coffee growing lands. The emergent coffee 
bourgeoisie was encouraged to give these peasant 
households 
production. 
access to 
In return 
plots 
they 
of land for foodstuff 
would provide their labor 
services when labor was required for coffee cultivation. 
This combination left them tied to the land and to a 
patron for the rest of their lives. This was 
characteristic of a hacienda economy. 
It is important to reinforce the point that the 
introduction of coffee had a considerable impact on the 
Nicaraguan economy. State infrastructure, power and the 
concentration of the populace tended to be centred in the 
main coffee growing areas. These included the volcanic 
hills west of Managua, the Diriamba uplands which 
included such towns as San Maros., .linot.epe and Diriamba, 
and the Matagalpa and Jinotega regions. Since foreign 
investors were mainly concerned with profit, they tended 
to invest in areas where land was best suited for coffee 
cultivation. The development of coffee production in 
Nicaragua was compatible "with noncapitalist relations of 
production interior to the haciendas and the coexistence 
of subsistence production and export production ... 9 Though 
some peasants were forced to assume the role of wage 
to be laborer, 
involved 
the bulk of -the population continued 
subsistence production. In addition, though 
some small landholders participated in coffee cultivation 
it was predominan-tly prosperous commercial speculators 
who had the capital to invest in the machinery and 
manpower. 
The characteristics of coffee production in Nicaragua 
help to substantiate Paige's theory that hacienda 
structures, where both the upper class and the cultivator 
class are dependent on land, contribute to a conservative 
apathetic and badly organized agricultural working 
class. In Nicaragua the peasantry in the coffee growing 
areas became part salaried employees who participated in 
coffee cultivation during the coffee harvest but always 
returned to a subsistence milieu after the harvest period 
was over. This explains the relative stability of 
Nicaragua in the pre-vYorld War II decades. 10 
The Post 1950 Nicaraguan Economy: Uneven Development and the 
Rapid Expansion of Cotton 
After 1950 Nicaragua's economic structure changed. 
Certain signs of change began to appear as early as the 
late 1930's when certain producers and merchants of the 
Pacific coastal region began to look for sources of 
accumulation other than coffee production. Significant 
export demand existed in the late 1930's and early 1940's 
for cotton and sesame. Somoza himself was interested in 
diversifying the economy to consolidate his regime 
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militarily through the economically, as he had done 
National Guard. He attempted to do so by using the state 
and modernization of to encourage the diversification 
agriculture, thus stimulating new sources of accumulation 
from which he himself could profit. "The policies of the 
state (especially the National Bank) facilitated the 
incipient expansion of cotton and sesame production as 
well as imports of a significant number of tractors, 
leading to some mechanization", 11 
The new Nicaraguan producers involved in cotton and 
sesame were often of merchant or urban origin. "These 
producers acted more like classical capitalists in their 
annual investment decisions, and began to introduce 
machinery and agrochemical inputs ... 12 These changes in 
the late 1930's and 1940's were a preview of the deeper 
transformation of the Nicaraguan economy which was to 
occur in the early 1950's. As the Korean war heightened 
the demand for cotton, speculators began to invest 
heavily because of the sharp increase in the world 
price. Where cotton constituted a mere 5 percent of 
Nicaragua's total exports in 1950, it increased at a rate 
of 33 percent per year starting in 1955. 13 The growth of 
cotton, unlike coffee, introduced a modern dependent 
capitalism into Nicaragua; 
where the development of coffee production 
for export firmly integrated Nicaragua into the 
international economy, it was the development 
of cotton production in the 1950's that 
consolidated the development of agrarian 
capitalism and thY4 agro-export basis of 
Nicaragua's economy. 
Coffee production was compatible with non-capitalist 
relations, but cotton production "required the clearing 
of the haciendas as a modern infrastructure was to be 
laid in place ... 15 The expansion of cotton production also 
had a triple significance: a deepening dependency, 
sealing the predominantly agricultural character of the 
bourgeoisie, and dramatically widening the gulf between 
the dominant classes and the enlarged rural 
proletariat ... 16 
The process of capitalist accumulation in Nicaragua 
developed unevenly as the dynamism of cotton expansion 
and other export-oriented agricultural products led to 
the dispossession of small food producers. The state 
allowed only a few groups of large export-oriented 
capitalist producers access to the state's resources and 
favourable policies. Small farmers were deprived of the 
best land and denied protection from the new 
export-oriented capitalists. To aid the export-oriented 
capitalists, the state embarked on accumulation-related 
activities which included, 
extensive 
access to 
roadbui lding, 
land, expanded 
which facilitated 
credit, favorable 
exchange rates, and tariff and pricing policies 
which stimulated investment in labor-saving 
machinery and use of yield increasing inputs, 
and publicly subsidized provision of irrigation 
and research as well f~ storage, processing and 
marketing facilities. 
58. 
The expansion of cotton production also resulted in 
landholdings being centralized which had the added effect 
of breaking down the old Conservative- Liberal dichotomy 
which had marked Nicaraguan history for over 100 years. 18 
In addition it stimulated the development of a modern 
bourgeoisie which was instrumental in expropriating land 
from the peasantry in order to create a mass of landless 
workers. This new rural proletariat was free to sell its 
labor power but more importantly it had lost its own 
means of production. The expansion of cotton production, 
like the growth of coffee cultivation, brought about the 
massive displacement of the peasantry. 
Important questions arise if we are to test Jeffery 
Paige's theory. Was the expansion of cotton more 
extensive than the development of coffee cultivation had 
been in the pre-World War II era? Did cotton enterprises 
expand throughout Nicaragua or did subsistence production 
continue in some regions? Lastly did cotton as a 
commodity differ from coffee? Was it more capital 
intensive or more labor intensive? 
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Cotton Production 
Cotton cultivation was and still is concentrated in one 
region of Nicaragua, the Pacific Coastal plain, 
particularly in the departments of Chinandega, Leon and 
Managua. (see Figure 3.1.) Prior to the expansion of 
cotton, many peasants were employed in the coastal 
livestock haciendas as tenants and sharecroppers. These 
enterprises were involved in extensive cattle grazing, 
domestic food crops and the production of sesame for 
export. The cotton boom displaced small producers of 
corn, beans, rice and sorghum. The new class of cotton 
entrepreneurs rented the land from the hacienda owners. 
(Approximately 52 percent of the land in cotton was 
rented. 19) Rental arrangements "simplified severing of 
any ties or claims which may have existed between 
previous landlords and their sharecroppers ... 20 Eventually 
as much as 80 percent of the cultivated land was 
converted to cotton. 21 Although some cattle ranches were 
transformed into cotton plantations, most of the land 
that was used was appropriated from small peasant 
producers of grains and staples. Between 1952 and 1967, 
cotton acreage expanded approximately 400 percent. 22 By 
the mid 1960's cotton was cultivated on 80 percent of the 
total arable land of the Pacific Coast and 40 percent of 
all cultivated land in Nicaragua. 
Figure 3.1. Map of Nicaragua 
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Since cotton growers did not risk much by expanding 
into more land, they treated land as well as labor as 
commodities. They also "combined these with 
productivity-increasing inputs and machinery on an 
unprecedented scale. ,,23 Large cotton producers 
increasingly dominated this process and were organized 
into powerful regional associations through which 
they exerted considerable influence over the 
allocation of state resources and on state 
policies and institutions. Large cotton 
growers also participated heavily in the 
profits of cotton-related services. They 
created private financial groups, such as the 
Banco Nicaraguense, and controlled many of the 
estimated seventy commercial firms supplying 
cotton inputs and equipment. as well as the 
thirty gins which processed cotton. Some large 
cotton producers also invested in the new 
insecticide plants which increasingly mixed and 
packaged these inputs domestically and some 
became involved in the foreign marketing of 
cotton and in the domestic processing of 
cottonseed into vegetable oil. These 
activities were highly concentrated. Less than 
twenty exporters, most of them owned by or 
associated with foreign firms, handled all 
cotton exports, and five of these controlled 
most of the trade. 24 
While cotton became very regionalized and concentrated 
in the hands of large producers, it was, like coffee, 
subject to cycles of boom and bust. 25 Also, since it 
became concentrated in the hands of a small number of 
large producers it was a very capital intensive product 
compared to coffee. The great investment in machinery, 
fertilizer, insecticides and labor meant that "small 
scale production of cotton was simply out of th"e 
question. ,,26 
The cotton growing areas were understandably plagued by 
social tensions. One reason why mechanical techniques in 
planting and harvesting were utilized27 was labor 
problems. Peasant; farmers who had characteristically 
farmed their own plots of land had been reduced to 
landless peasants or part-time wage laborers. 
limited proportion of these small producers 
permanent. laborers on the cotton plantations. 
Only a 
became 
As cotton 
production expanded, some of these small food producers 
were forced to cultivate on smaller plots or migrate to 
lower quality and less accessible land in the interior. 28 
Since these small farmers lacked access to credit and 
agrochemical inputs, their average yields in food crops 
fell during the 1950' s and continued to fall in the 60" s 
and 70's. In addition to their yields decreasing, Somoza 
and the Instituto Nacional de Commercia Exterior y 
Interior (INCEI) acted to keep the prices of internally 
grown food crops such as corn, sorghum, beans and rice 
lower than world prices. These economic hardships of 
small peasants forced large landowners to contend with 
the problem of peasant invasions. Peasants would often 
try to reclaim their lost land by organizing and invading 
large landowners. Between 1950 and 1970 it was 
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documented that 370 land invasions occurred, particularly 
where cotton cultivation was centered in the Chinandega 
and Leon region. 29 In the period between 1964 and 1973 
alone, 240 invasions took place. 30 The peasants responded 
to the changing conditions of production through direct 
attacks or migration, Those who did not move to other 
areas remained 
unemployment. 
in a state of poverty and chronic 
As the number of landless peasants increased the state 
was forced to become more dependent on extralegal force. 
Paige suggests that the economic weakness of the upper 
class leads it to "close off all avenues of social action 
except violent resistance". 31 In the case of Nicaragua, 
cotton expansion required the clearing of vast amounts of 
land. To protect the interests of large landowners those 
peasants who resisted expulsion risked being burnt out by 
the National Guard. Somoza and 
officers made personal fortunes 
cotton. 32 
the National Guard 
from the export of 
Stagnant Food Production and State Reforms 
As noted above, small food producers were deprived of 
access to fertile land, credit and adequate support 
prices. The growing contradictions which developed 
through state supported expansion of cotton forced many 
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peasants to stop producing basic food crops. Since the 
peasant sector was the basic producer of grains, their 
dispossession from grain producing land combined with the 
conversion of this land to export crops and the total 
lack of state attention to this sector resulted in basic 
grain production failing to keep pace with population 
growth. 33 Since the state was primarily responsible for 
fostering these contradictions, it initiated several 
reform policies in the 1960's and 1970's. These reform 
policies were engendered in the midst of mounting rural 
tensions. Were these policies instituted with the 
implicit purpose of alleviating the poverty and 
exploitation of the peasantry or were they primarily 
aimed at rural stabilization or pacification of small 
producers? Furthermore, did Somoza see these landless 
semi-proletarians who had been small producers as a 
potentially revolutionary class? 
these questions a description 
To begin answering 
of the reformist 
activitities instituted by the Somoza government is 
necessary. 
The reformist efforts of the 1960's and 1970's were 
aimed at the rapid and uneven accumulation process which 
had left small producers with greater tenure insecurity 
and landlessness. These factors had resulted in the 
stagnation of domestic food crop production. One of the 
first programs the state initiated was a highly 
subsidized program of irrigated and mechanized rice 
production. This program benefitted fewer than 100 large 
capitalist rice producers. 34 The state subsidized 
irrigation infrastructttre and offered "very high support 
prices, storage facilities, export marketing services as 
well as credit and favorable treat,rnent for machinery 
imports". 35 The state-assistance provided for irrigated 
rice was a sharp contrast to the state assistance 
provided for other food crops. In fact, 
because of the high support prices for rice, 
the state agency in charge of food purchases 
(INCEI) often did not have much of a budget 
left over to buy other domestic food crops, 
even at fairly low prices. Similarly,. large 
capitalist rice producers benefitted 
disproportionat§~y from the bank credit granted 
for food crops. 
These measures led to average rice yields doubling 
during the 1960's which led to Nicaragua increasing its 
quantity of rice for export during the early 1970's. 
In reaction to the problem of landlessness the 
Nicaraguan government enacted an Agrarian Reform law and 
established the Instituto Nacional Agrario (IAN). The 
implicit purpose of the Instituto and the Reform law was 
rural stabilization or pacification of small producers. 
Since land redistribution in the Pacific Coastal region 
was "unthinkable," according to stat,e authorities, 
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agrarian reform was aimed at essentially resettling 
dispossessed small producers in a few colonization 
projects and the provision of land titles in these and 
other remote areas to which they migrated. The IAN 
essentially 
mediated landlord-tenant conflicts by 
offering some land in Nicaragua's large 
agricultural frontier region, and, through its 
titling program, it legitimized some of the 
spontaneous migrants to this region who had 
establ~shed themselves on public or unclaimed 
land. S 
The IAN's attempt at colonization had very little 
impact. Only 16,500 families 38 had benefitted from this 
program by the late 1970's. Unlike other state-sponsored 
capitalist activities39 these families were not able to 
receive credit, technical assistance or agricultural 
inputs once they settled on their new plots of land. 
Another facet of the agrarian reform program was the 
availability of rural credit to many smallholders who 
were not seen as creditworthy. Since 
a major determinent of credit-worthiness was 
the possession of clear land title, most small 
producers did not qualify, and had to rely on 
themselves or borrow funds from larger 
producers, input suppliers, truckers or 
processors, often at !sterest rates as high as 
10 percent per month. 
Though the Banco Nacional (BNN) was set up with the 
expressed purpose of providing credit for small-holders, 
a significant port,ion of the funds were lent to small and 
medium sized coffee and cotton producers. Although loans 
authorized by the (BNN) rose during the 1960's and 
1970's, most. of them were made to rice producers. If 
loans to rice producers are excluded. crop producers 
consistently received less than 10 percent of the total 
loans. The state responded to small food producers in a 
half-hearted effort. The lack of credit to the majority 
of small food producers meant that they were unable to 
use yield-raising inputs such as fertilizers and only 14 
percent, used insecticides. 41 In contrast, large 
capitalist producers of irrigated rice and agro-export 
products received many resources, including credit. The 
poverty of small food producers and the decrease in food 
crop production was not seen as a priority by the state. 
The reformist programs were a half-hearted at-tempt to 
satisfy conditions set out by foreign aid donors which 
demanded reform in order for the Nicaraguan state to 
receive more foreign aid. They were not geared toward 
accumulation but towards legitimation. The poverty of 
small producers continued because of the dynamism of the 
agrarian capitalist sector, but this sector also limited 
the "accumulation possibilities for 4° local industry". t... 
Since many small food producers lacked access to credit, 
it is not surprising that yields for food crops continued 
to decline. 
Support prices for the major food crops grown by small 
holders, which included corn, sorghum and beans, was 
another issue which caused major internal strife. 
Support prices were introduced in the late 1950's, and 
although the Instituto Naclonal de Commercio Exterior y 
Interior (INCEI) "was created to implement the state's 
price support, storage and marketing activities, ,,43 
prices for basic food crops remained extremely low. 
Because of a "I imi ted budget and t.be high rice prices and 
purchases, INCEr consistently operated at a loss and was 
unable to purchase other food crops even at the low 
announced prices. ,,44 
This forced small producers to sell their output as 
quickly as possible and at very low prices. Since the 
general income of the population was low, effective 
demand was usually insufficient to raise internal prices 
to equal those of neighboring countries. In addition, 
the absence of a marketing organization for peasant 
producers prevented any eA~ortation of basic grains. 
Somoza also used the National Guard to prevent small 
producers from organizing. vvhen 
basic grain prices tended to increase to 
world price levels because of either a poor 
crop or increased internal demand, the Somoza 
government resorted to imports (usually 
subsidized by long-term PL 480 credits) in 
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order to hold prices down and t:.hus reduce 
pressure on wages 45 . 
All of this was designed to help keep grain prices low 
for the urban consumers, especially those in 
capital. The Somoza government 
also established a network of retail 
distribu.tion outlets for urban consumers 
(INCEl) to help keep basic grain prices in the 
cities low. Of the 322 ou~~e·ts in t.he country, 
240 were in urban Managua. 
the 
It was apparent in the early 1970's that Somoza's 
reform programs aimed at small producers were merely a 
token effort. The state's agencies which were assigned 
to implement these programs were weak, poorly coordinated 
and faced constant financial crises. The efforts of the 
programs also failed to affect the diminishing quantity 
of accessible land. The failure of these programs 
prompted the Somoza government to implement another 
reformist rural development strategy. In 1975 INVIERNO, 
or the Instituto de Bienestar Campesino, began to 
function through an aid loan of $12 million dollars. 
INVIERNO "quickly became the 'piece de resistance' of the 
state's new reformist strategy for rural Nicaragua, 
complete with detailed operational manuals and a slick 
computerized data processing syst.em. ,,47 The aim of 
INVlERNO was promoting integrated rural development 
projects. Tv/o such projects were organized in two food 
and coffee growing areas vli.thin the Central Pacific and 
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Central Interior regions. These areas were characterized 
by extreme poverty and some guerrilla activity. The 
projects attempted to reduce the growing discontent and 
increase food supplies for approximately five thousand 
families in the two regions. In addition the projects 
placed emphasis on expanding production through credit" 
technical assistance, input supplies and marketing 
services. Another facet of the projects included health 
and nutrition, road development and housing activities. 
Though INVIERNO \'las far more organized than the previous 
reform program, it served a small number of small 
producers who had secure land titles. As Biderman notes; 
-the reform program "contributed to tb,e development of a 
petty-bourgeois or kulak class of small producers who 
were expected to provide greater political stability to 
the project areas ... 48 
Lack of Access to Land and Stable Employment 
As the pattern of state assistance continued to benefit 
large capitalist producers, an increasing number of small 
food producers found themselves without access to land 
and were forced to assume the role of wage laborers. For 
example, it can be seen in Table 3.1 that in 1952 plots 
of land under ten manzanas (about seven hectares) made up 
65% of the total of agrarian units and represented 3.46% 
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Table 3.1. Changes in Land Tenure in Nicaragua, 1952-1978. 
Percentage of Units 
Strata 1952 1963 . 1971 .~ 1978 
Total .88 1. 47 2.16 1. 78 
',Multifamily 
500 man. 
and over 
Total 14.02 20.35 23.28 19.98 
Medium 
Mul tifamily 
50 man. and 
over 
Total 20.07 27.38 29.53 33.89 
Family 10-50 
man. 
Total 65.03 50.80 45.03 44.35 
ISubfamily 
less than 
10 ma.."l. 
Percent. of Area 
.Strata 1952 1963 1971 1978 
Total 39.76 41.19 45.44 50.24 
Multifamily 
500 man. 
·and over 
Total 43.52 44.12 42.84 35.66 
Medium 
Mul tifamily 
50 man. and 
over 
.Total 13.26 11. 25 9.68 12.14 
Family 10-50 
man. 
. Total 3.46 .3.44 2.04 1. 96 
. Subfamily 
less than 
10 man. 
Source: Table adapted from Solon Barraclough, A Preliminary 
Analysis of the Nicaraguan Food System, A progress 
report of Research being carried out under UNRISD's 
project "Food Systems and Society". (Geneva; UNRISD 
1982), p. 21. 
(one manzana = .705 hectares) 
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of the land. By 1978 this number had decreased and it 
was estimated that 44% of 'the agrarian units were under 
seven hectares and represented 1.96% of the land. While 
a decrease in small plots of land was occurring, the 
opposite was true of big farms. Those with more than 350 
hectares rose from 39.76% of the arable land in 1952 to 
50.24% in 1978. In 1979 prior to the revolution Somoza 
and his family controlled approximately 70,000 hectares 
of land while 210,000 agrarian workers and peasants were 
landless, 49 
Real accessibility to land was more restricted than t;he 
figures above suggest. Most of the landless workers were 
employed during the harvest season 
lacked permanent employment. In 
indicates that 32 percent of the 
for major crops but 
Table 3.2 the data 
agricultural workers 
were permanent or seasonal laborers without access to 
land. The landless workers numbered approximately 
135,000 but this total should perhaps take into account 
the owners of sub-family holdings or minifundias. There 
was an estimated 150,000 workers with access to 
minifundias (minifundias include plots of land from 0 to 
9.9 manzanas but it must be remembered that less than 1 
hect.are of land is considered landpoor and 1 manzana is 
equal t.o .705 hectares). Since those with minifundias 
numbered approximately 150,000 many of these owners would 
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Table 3.2. Landholding Patterns for Nicaragua in 1978. 
STRATA 
Owners and/ or operators 
of large estates 
Owners and/or operators 
of medium sized estates 
Owners and/or operators 
of family sized farms 
Owners and/or operators 
minifundias 
(0-9.9 manz.) 
*Salaried permanent 
workers 
**Seasonal workers 
Permanent or Seasonal 
workers without access 
to land (this total 
includes the above 
two categories) 
Number of Workers Percentage 
29,000 .6 
38,000 8.9 
97,300 22.5 
157,600 36.5 
60,900 14.1 
75,200 17.4 
35,000 32 
*Permanent in the sense they had no other means of livelihood. 
Over half are estimated by CIERA to have received wages for 
less than nine months per year. 
**These are the seasonal workers estimated not to have had 
access to land in minifundia. Some of these workers may 
reside with peasant families during part of the year. 
Source: Table adapted from Solon Barraclough, A Preliminary 
Analysis of the Nicaraguan Food System, p. 27. 
74. 
be classified as land poor. As Solon Barraclough 
suggests, in addition to their own production, 
most of these minifundistas depended for 
their livelihood on part time agricultural work 
by themselves and family members on large 
commercial farms or associated agro-export 
activities. These estimates suggest that over 
one-third of the total agricultural labour 
force were part-time wage workers and part-time 
small producers. ~8ese could be considered as 
a semi-proletariat. 
As the problem of landlessness began to increase in 
Nicaragua, peasants were forced to contend with 
increasing pressures. Since Nicaragua's regions varied 
in terms of resources, population and land resource 
potential, it is expected that those regions where 
increased landlessness and sharecropping or migratory 
labor estates existed should also have been the areas 
where the Sandinistas received greater support. Since 
Paige has linked a sharecropping structure with rice and 
cotton, and migratory labor with coffee and grapes, it 
should be expected that those areas with rice, cotton, 
coffee or grapes as well as a high population density 
should also be the areas where the Sandinistas received 
their greatest support. To probe the question of whether 
the pattern of support for the Sandinistas was directly 
linked to the particular regions which had a dynamic 
agro-export economy based on the above export crops, it 
is important to examine the three regions of Nicaragua 
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and the pressures the peasants were forced to struggle 
with during the 1970's. 
The South and Central Pacific Lowlands 
The South and Central Pacific Lowlands includes the 
departments of Rivas, Managua, Leon 
Figure 3.2.) This region in particular 
and Jinotepe. (see 
was the site of 
rapid cotton cultivation and capital intensive irrigated 
rice cultivation. Cotton expansion began seriously in 
the 1950's and increased from 2,100,000 quintals in 1960, 
to 5,200,000 quintals in 1970, and 8,200,000 quintals in 
1978. 51 
This area also became the site of sugar-cane production 
and increased livestock farming. 52 Vast areas of the 
Pacific Coastal region and the southern interior were 
taken over for pasture and areas suitable for sugar 
production were put into cane. Large commercial 
producers continued to expand into areas where many small 
holders and peasants farmed their own plots of land. 
During the 1950's and 1960's this brought about the 
massive displacement of the peasantry as many tenants 
(colonos) and sharecroppers were expelled from 
haciendas. This occurred for two reasons; first large 
capitalist producers were expanding in search of greater 
profi ts and, second, they required a free floating labor 
Figure 3.2. Map of iC)[lS Niearagua. 
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Source: Thomas Walker, Nicaragua: The Land of Sandino 
(Boulder: Westview Press, 1981) 
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force to be available at harvest time. 
As many peasants were forced off their lands.. large and 
medium sized producers were interested in there being 
enough land available for sufficient production of cheap 
basic grains to feed the workforce. Gradually much basic 
grain production was shifted from the Pacific Coastal 
areas to the agricultural frontier. (see Figure 3.3.) As 
many peasants were forced off their lands, the labor 
oversupply kept living conditions depressed and rural 
wages extremely low. In addition, neither coffee nor 
Ii vestock farming could absorb this addit.ional labor and 
served to increase the power of large landowners. The 
fact that approximately "two-thirds of the agricultural 
work foroe were either part-time seasonal wage workers or 
depended fully on wages for their incomes . helps t.o 
explain why this discontent was strongest in the Pacific 
regions where wage labour in agro-exports was most 
important. ,,53 
If we consider population density, statistics indicate 
that the Pacific region was the most densely populated 
region in Nicaragua. (see Table 3.3 which shows the 
differences in population density among the three regions 
of Nicaragua.) Some areas in the Pacific Lowlands 
averaged a density of more than 150 per square mile, 
while others such as Masaya near Lake Nicaragua had a 
Figure 3.3. 
·MACROREGIONS OF NICABACUA 
Source: Solon Barraclough, A Prelimina~ Analysis 
of the Nicaraguan Food System, p. 31. 
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Table 3.3. Density Statistics For the Three Areas of Nicaragua. 
Pacific Area 
This area 
includes: 
includes: 
Rivas 
Chinandega 
Carazo 
Granada 
Leon 
Managua 
Masaya 
1950 
83.25 persons 
per square mile 
1959 
118.5 persons 
per square mile 
1963 
123.68 persons 
per square mile 
1978 
146.9 persons 
per square mile 
Central Highlands 
This area 
includes: 
Nueva Segovia 
Boaco 
Chontales 
Esteli 
Jinotega 
Madriz 
Matagalpa 
1950 
38.9 persons 
per square mile 
1959 
48.5 persons 
per square mile 
1963 
56.25 persons 
per square mile 
1978 
48.3 persons 
per square mile 
Atlantic Region 
This area 
includes: 
Rio San ,Juan 
Zelaya 
1950 
2.76 persons 
per square mile 
1959 
3.4 persons 
per square mile 
1963 
4.4 persons 
per square mile 
1978 
4.5 persons 
per square mile 
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rural density of approximately 400 persons 
mile. 54 (see Figure 3.4.) 
per square 
Throughout the 1960's the FSLN 
the peasants and rural workers of 
attempted to organize 
this region. Many 
urban cadres were living in rural areas learning about 
the problems of the peasantry, but the organizational 
work was limited. The work of the FSLN was scrutinized 
closely and any radical tendencies were suppressed 
quickly by the National Guard. One attempt for example 
"to form a union in the cotton growing area of Chinandega 
resulted in the assassination of some 300 peasants and 
workers at the hands of the National Guard". 55 Later in 
the 1970's other attempts were made to organize unions. 
One particular example was a sugar plantation in San 
Antonio. The attempt, however, was a failure because the 
enterprise dismissed strikers and organizers and employed 
the National Guard against the strikers. In 1977 a 
walkout of five thousand workers eventually won cane 
cutters wage gains and improved working conditions, 56 
The South and Central Pacific Lowlands did not allow 
the permanent presence of the revolutionary guerrillas 
because of its open terrain and its high population 
density. Other organizations, however, had a high 
profile in this region and contributed to the 
radicalization of the peasantry. Support for the 
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Figure 3.4. 
Populo.tion Oensity in Nic:cr~9VQ, by Departments. 
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Robert C. West and John P. Augelli, Middle America 
{Englewood Cliffs .. New Jersey: Prentiee-:-Hall, ~1966j 
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Sandinistas was achieved through such organizations as 
the ATC (Asociacion de Trabajadores del Campo) and 
through CEPA (Comites Evangelica de Promocion Agraria). 
The ATC was a revolutionary political organization which 
aimed to bring Somoza's dictatorship to an end. It was 
comprised of agricultural workers and semiproletarians 
who shared exploitive material conditions which included 
12 to 15 hour working days, low wages and insufficient 
access to land. They forged a political alliance which 
transcended short-term economic demands to challenge the 
state. CEPA was another organization which contributed 
to raising the awareness and consciousness of these 
agricultural workers and peasants. It trained community 
leaders in technical agricultural skills by integrating 
this with religious training. 
The Central Highlands 
The north central portion of Nicaragua will be referred 
to as the Central Highlands and will include such towns 
as Esteli, Matagalpa and Nueva Segovia. Here the 
population density is approximately 50 to 80 persons per 
square mile which is considerably less than the Pacific 
zone. 57 Also, the "rugged terrain, and the poor soils, as 
well as the scant and hostile Indian population combined 
to discourage agricultural developments similar to those 
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of the Pacific Lowland. ,,58 For this reason the Central 
Highlands were not as developed as was the Pacific 
region. Subsistence farming, small landholdings and 
dispersed settlements characterized this rural area. The 
post-1950 changes were not as dramatic in this area, 
although increased coffee cultivation occurred, which 
raised land prices and forced many small farmers to sell 
their farms. In the post-1950 era the Matagalpa and 
Jinotega areas began producing nearly half of Nicaragua's 
crop. The coffee fincas controlled 25 to 75 acre 
holdings. 59 This area, like the South and Central Pacific 
Lowlands, had a population growing faster than it could 
be absorbed into the economy. Day laborers and 
sharecroppers were forced to accept scant wages and 
abysmal living conditions. 
The guerrillas (FSLN) had been present in this zone 
since 1958. This was in part the result of this territory 
having been associated with Sandino's struggles in the 
1930's.60 Since "this had been Sandino's territory, the 
regime distrusted and mistreated its campesinos. 
Repression of peasants by public officials, and 
especially by the Guard, became quite commonplace in the 
1960's and 1970's. Such abuse further alienated the 
populace from the government ... 61 Over the thirty year 
period after Sandino's death there were few attempts at 
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rural organizing because Somoza quickly repressed any 
such action. Only after 1960 slowly did the peasantry 
gain confidence in the FSLN. When the guerrillas gained 
momentum in the 1970's the regime escalated its agrarian 
"reform program which essentially relocated peasants away 
from infested zones. ,,62 Other measures the regime adopted 
included coercion and torture and many peasants were 
killed by the National Guard to discourage support for 
the FSLN. This suggests that 
a traditional admiration for regional hero 
Sandino. a pronounced anti-Somoza feeling, 
organizational efforts by the CEPA, and the 
brutal excesses of official repression in zone 
two [Central Highlands] appear to have been the 
main factors that led or drove3 zone two peasants into the arms of the FSLN.o 
Paige's theory however offers additional insights into 
why support for the FSLN was predominant in this region. 
While the expansion of coffee was not extremely 
exploitive in the pre-1950 era, it forced many small 
farmers in the Central Highlands in the post 1950 period 
to sell their farms. The increase in coffee cultivation 
did not allow small farmers to work part-time as day 
laborers and return to subsistence farming. The 
depressed wages for day laborers and sharecroppers left 
small farmers with few options. Many migrated outside 
the region to state land reform projects only to find 
inadequate land and a lack of access to credit. 
Figure 3.5. 
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Agricultural regions and zone of FSLN develop-
ment 1961-77. 
Source: John A. Booth, The End and the Beginning: The-
Nicaraguan Revolu~ion (Boulder: Westview Press, 
1981), p. 117. 
The Atlantic Coastal Region 
The last region of Nicaragua which will be examined 
will be the Atlantic Coast. Figure 3.5 outlines the 
agricultural regions which were the FSLN's zones of 
impact prior to the revolution. It suggests that the 
FSLN was active in the eastern portions of Boaco" 
Juigalpa, and Nueva Segovia plus the 
Northwestern portion Zelaya's little populated public 
lands. Some of the areas outlined in this map should 
more appropriately be included as part of -the Central 
Highlands. For the purpose of discussing where the FSLN 
received its initial support, (as depicted in Figure 3.5) 
it will be referred to as the Atlantic Region and will 
encompass some areas historically considered to be part 
of the Central Highlands. 
is important to note that the main economic 
activities which characterized this region were largely 
in the hands of foreign interests and they luded: 
exploit,at,ion of wild forest products, gold mining, and 
plant,at~ion agriculture. 64 Little permanent settlement 
resul t,ed from these acti ies. This area became a major 
attrac·tion for peasant migration from zones one and two 
in the 1950' sand 1960' s. Government reform pro~iects had 
been iz in this area and many peasants migrat.ed in 
order to secure a plot of land and more commonly to 
escape the repression of the National Guard. The peasants 
unknowingly encountered a new form of repression by 
officials known as the juez de mesta. 
The juez de mesta spied for the government 
and exercised certain police powers. It became 
common for many jueces to abuse their influence 
in order to steal newly improved agricultural 
plots from squatters, whose shaky land tit,les 
made them highly vulnerable to anyone close to 
the government. 05 
The Atlantic region attracted the repression of the 
National Guard but for different reasons than Zone two. 
Zone three had become the site of the Capuchin fathers 
spiritual organization known as the Delegates of the 
Word. They began to serve the spiritual and socioeconomic 
needs of the peasants of Zelaya. Nine hundred community 
organizers became active in promoting peasant 
organizations. BS The National Guard attempted to repress 
these organizations through tortures and killings. Many 
turned to the FSLN in the face of this disillusionment 
since they had an active presence in the region. 
If we are to examine the Atlantic region, the other 
areas of Zelaya must also be examined, as well as 
Bluefields and Rio Coco. Many of the inhabitants of this 
region have a culturally and racially distinct history of 
separateness from the other Nicaraguan people. This 
separateness has been reinforced by bad communications 
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and the lack of an all weather road which would link this 
region to the other parts of the country. 'rhe Atlantic 
Coast is made up of inhabitants who were decendants of 
immigrants from South America whereas inhabitants of 
western Nicaragua were largely of MesoAmerican origin. 
During the colonial period the British controlled this 
region and introduced into the region English-speaking 
black slaves. As a result most of the inhabitants of the 
region speak English and/or Indian rather than Spanish 
and have different cultural traditions from the hispanic 
majority. 
Not surprisingly the Miski to Indians (who make up 24?~ 
of the Atlant,ic Coast's population) the Sumo Indians 
(2.5%) and Caribbean Creoles (10%) have simply not 
trust,ed the people of Western Nicaragua. 67 Somoza was 
able to use Indians and Creoles in disproportionate 
numbers in the National Guard because of their 
willingness to fight westerners. Neither Sandino in the 
1930's nor the FSLN in the 1970's were able to include 
these easterners in their revolutionary efforts. Many 
costenos (coastal people) resented "the fact that some of 
Sandino's guerrilla operations in 
foreign-owned extractive industries 
once been employed ... 68 In addition 
Zelaya disrupted 
in which they had 
many remembered how 
Sandino's opposition had also caused many villages around 
the Rio Coco to sustain damage and led to missionaries 
and other friendly foreigners being harmed. 
In eonclusion, the Atlantic region's population seemed 
to mixed in support for the Sandinistas. Most of the 
Miskicto Indians and other cuI tu ly distinct groups 
remained uninvolved the popular insurrection. The 
lvli and their church related act ies advocated 
tolerance of the government. They perceived the 
Sandinistas and lr socialist ideology or a greater 
evil. In contrast many spanish speaking costenos were 
influenced by Catholic missionaries, mostly Franciscans 
and Capuchins from the United States, v,1ho were more 
liberal their teachings. These Catholic missionaries 
influenced many pioneer agriculturalists from the west; in 
the interior mining area and peasants who lived in ·the 
eastern portions of Boaco, 
Segovia. 
Juigalpa, Matagalpa and Nueva 
The 1 of for the Sandinistas ·the Atlantic 
region by various indigenous groups can be partially 
explained by considering Paige's theory. If we consider 
the quest. ion of access to land we find that the Miski to 
continued itional istence production since 
sufficient land existed and was never a problem as it was 
in the Pacific region. In addition, the majority of the 
population in the two major commercial and administrative 
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port towns of the coast (Bluefields in the south and 
Puerto Cabezas in the north) were artisans, wage laborers 
and successful merchants. 69 Caribbean Creoles were the 
majority population in these two major centres as well as 
in the three or four smaller market towns and 
administrative centers on the Rio Coco. 
A close examination of the Nicaraguan economy and the 
changes which have occurred in recent decades have 
generally supported Paige's general theory of agrarian 
revolution. We can now turn to Honduras, Nicaragua's 
neighbor and a country which has been acclaimed an "oasis 
of peace" amidst the turbulence and repression of other 
Central American countries. Would Paige's theory also 
explain the absence of revolutionary change in Honduras? 
We turn to this question in the next chapter. 
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Chapter Four 
HONDURAS 
Despite the revolutionary changes which 
in Nicaragua, Honduras, a neighboring 
have occurred 
country, has 
remained relatively stable. Honduras provides a sound 
contrast to Nicaragua. Our general question is whether 
the economic and social conditions in Honduras differ 
from those in Nicaragua in such a way and to such an 
extent that (according to Paige) they provide an 
explanation as to why a revolution has not occurred. 
Specifically, this chapter will consider such questions 
as: Did Honduras follow the same pattern of economic 
development as Nicaragua lrl recent decades? v.Jas an 
absentee landed oligarchy a condition which limited 
Honduras' economy and capitalist 
Nicaragua's? And, were there 
development 
factors in 
as it did 
Honduras' 
capitalist development which suggest (according to 
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Paige's theory) that Honduras would not experience a 
revolution but perhaps a different type of social 
chang'e? 
The Economic and Political Structure of Honduras 
in the 1800's 
Through most of the nineteenth century Honduras was one 
of the most sparsely populated countries in Central 
America. In 1895, the population was estimated at 
400,000. Although only 20-30%1 of the Honduran land mass 
was suitable for agricultural production, there was 
little pressure for developing the agricultural potential 
of this land. Since a market in land didn't exist, there 
was little motivation to destroy the old communal forms 
of 1 andovITling such as the ejido. 2 Unlike patterns in 
other Central American countries, Honduras' landholding 
pattern remained unchanged because a coffee oligarchy 
failed to arise. This was "due in part to the fact that 
coffee-producing areas were hard to get to, but more 
importantly there was neither a pressure to use land more 
productively nor was there a large landless workforce 
which could be harnessed to capitalist agricultural 
production ... 3 Also, coffee failed to reorient Honduran 
agriculture because of the preoccupation of Honduran 
governments with the intra-elite political conflicts and 
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the extreme difficulties which would have been involved 
in economically transporting coffee from the highlands in 
the absence of decent roads. 4 
Because of these various factors, beginning as early as 
1836, progressive land laws reserved large sections of 
public land as ejidos for municipalities to rent to small 
farmers. In the 1880-' s when many liberal reformers in 
other Central American countries abolished ejidos, 
Honduran authorities "were passing laws which justified 
the expropriation of private lands for ejidos where 
insufficient state land was available for a locality's 
growing population ... 5 
The political atmosphere in Honduras during the 1800's 
was very much determined by the political division 
throughout the isthmus between the Liberals and 
Conservatives. Since Honduras shared borders with 
Guatemala, El Salvador and Nicaragua, and t.hese neighbors 
were rivals for regional hegemony, any liberal or 
conservative regime saw a government of the opposite 
ideology on its borders as a potential threat ... 6 Between 
1821 and 1873 Honduras was ruled by 84 different 
presidents. All of these presidents were conservative 
except for liberal leader Trinidad Cabanas who ruled from 
1852 to 1855 when he was ousted by the conservative 
government of Guatemala which invaded Honduras and 
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installed conservative leader Santo Gardiola in office. 
The years between 1873 and 1882 were often characterized 
by outside interference. Liberal presidents Ponciano 
Leiva and Marco Aurelio Soto governed Honduras with the 
support of General Justo Rufino Barrios, the Guatemalan 
r"J 
strongman and leader. ( 
The Predominance of Foreign Agro-Exporting Firms and the 
Lack of a Native Oligarchy 
Like Nicaragua, Honduras was not characterized by the 
emergence of a local oligarchy which formed an alliance 
between local large landowners, merchants and foreign 
capital. In most of the republics in Central America a 
local oligarchy arose with the consolidation of coffee as 
an export crop. The coffee boom brought the economies of 
Central American republics into the world market and 
created an elite of coffee growers who gave some 
semblance of national identity to their countries. Where 
the liberals came to power they introduced far-reaching 
changes such as free trade, the breakup of Indian 
communal lands and a reduction in the power of the 
Church. They were instrumental in helping consolidate the 
power of the coffee oligarchies. 
Conditions in Honduras did not allow the growth of a 
coffee bourgeoisie and this is central to an 
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understanding of the economic and political development 
of Honduras. Since a coffee bourgeoisie did not emerge, 
the state remained weak as competing elites fought 
internal wars amongst themselves. This allowed the 
dominant groups in Honduras to continue ext,ensive 
exploitation of land and land rent. They were content 
with renting out their holdings to peasant farmers and 
creating and maintaining the "legal and political 
conditions necessary for the functioning of foreign 
capitalists ... 8 "These landowners were not able to 
organize an adequate state and were incapable of 
negotiating favorably with foreign capital beyond setting 
relatively 10v,7 export taxes and receiving bureaucratic 
and 'clientelistic' privileges for themselves ... 9 Since 
they were not interested in an economic alliance with 
these new foreign elites or inclined to convert their 
landholdings, the foreign fruit companies infiltrated and 
developed the commercial cultivation of bananas. 10 They 
imported large numbers of black workers from 
the Caribbean to work on their plantations. In 
the tropical valleys where commercial 
cultivation of the banana could prosper and 
where small national producers were no match 
for them, the fruit companies muscled their way 
in through a variety of illegal devices. One 
of those most often used was the 
"remeasurement." Banana companies (or local 
ranchers) would continually call for a resurvey 
of a neighbor's land which, remarkably, would 
always be shown to have smaller boundaries than 
previously thought. The companies would then 
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register the additional land in their name. 11 
The fruit companies accumulated vast tracts of land. 
This was the first stage of a two stage process. They 
penetrated the region and began the development of 
primary infrastructure. Although many small banana 
producers were displaced in favor of production within 
large capitalistic plantations, this only occurred if 
control over the production of the commodity served the 
monopoly's interest. Anthony Winson notes that this two 
stage process fails to take into account the fact that 
the monopoly banana concerns did not always 
find it in their interest to control the 
productive process. When a particular 
exploitation had become worn out through soil 
exhaustion, they preferred to purchase from 
private planters, for then the burden of 
unproductive land could be shifted onto the 
shoulders of the latter. ,,12 
The second stage involved the "consolidation of the 
enclave and firmly establishing its monopoly 
character. ,,13 The 
enclave character of the economic activity 
meant that infrastructural development realized 
by the investments of foreign concerns were 
generally ill-suited to serve the interests of 
national entrepreneurs, and in fact certain 
projects undertaken by the local state, most 
notably railroads, were reoriente~ by the 
banana firms to suit their own needs. 4 
Two banana companies in particular wielded power in 
Honduras in the early 1900's, the Standard Fruit Company 
and the Cuyamel Fruit Company. After 1912 the United 
Fruit Company emerged as a third force. In its quest to 
establish a monopo United Fruit created subsidiaries, 
the Tela and Trujillo companies. The Tela railroad 
company was established in 1913, and shortly after a 
subsidiary of United Fruit created the Trujillo Railroad 
company. The railroad companies were given substantial 
land subsidies for each mile of track which they 
constructed. The agreement held that the Trujillo 
Railway Co., "would build 12 kilometers of railway each 
year, or pay a fine of $2,000 yearly for each kilometer 
of railway construction that fell behind schedule ... 15 If 
t,his schedule was not met then the Honduran treasury 
would be prosperous enough with the fines of United Fruit 
to construct its own railway, The ultimate hope was that 
a national rail system would be created which would reach 
the highlands. The banana companies, however, used the 
railways to their own advantage. Instead of linking the 
existing c ies they used them to open up new banana 
lands. "For each kilometer of railway built, the 
companies received from 550 to 1,100 acres in lots of 
10,000 to 12,000 acres alternating with similar lots 
reserved for homesteaders ... 16 These vast areas were often 
not enough for the banana companies. Through the use of 
intermediaries they illegally acquired plots of land 
which had been set aside for homesteading. They wanted 
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plantations which were vast unbroken stretches of lando 
In the end Honduras' railways brought more strife than 
peace. The two banana companies Cuyamel and United Fruit 
engaged in disput:.es and in 1917 this carne to a head. The 
Cuyarnel Fruit Company, supported by Honduras, began to 
extend its rail lines to the Guatemalan border. This 
brought conflict with the United Fruit Company which was 
supported by Guatemala. Troops were sent into the area by 
Guatemala, but United States mediation curtailed the 
conflict. 
The foreign fruit companies and their hold on Honduras 
had three major consequences. First, their presence 
discouraged the emergence of a native local oligarchy; 
this is one characteristic which Honduras shared with 
Nicaragua. Second, the fruit companies gathered for 
themselves the best lands suitable for agricultureo By 
1910 80% of all banana lands were under the control of 
U.S. firms and by 1914 "the five principal 
concessionaries held more than one million acres of 
coastal land, much of it the most fertile land 
courrtryo .. 17 The third consequence was the great 
in the 
which the banana companies wielded in Honduras' political 
struc·ture. The political instability which characterized 
Honduras was often the result of the banana companies 
vying for greater concessions. 
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The Political Power of the Banana Companies 
The banana industry in Honduras ',vas marked by three 
distinct peri In the first period from 1860 to 1900 
bananas v,~ere rai s by Hondurans and sold the local 
competitive market to exporters. The second period 
1900-1929 was marked by the consolidation of the banana 
industry into three large North American Companies: the 
United Fruit Company, the St.andard Fruit Company and the 
Cuyamel Fruit Company. The third peri , from 1929, Vlas 
dominated by the supremacy of t,he United Fruit Company. 
Honduran politics also reached a turning point in 1929. 
S conflicts major a companies often 
led to for rival groups " revoluti on a 1';;'," " 
disturbances, it was beli that the of Cuyamel 
Fruit company and United it would introduce a measure 
of ility to Honduras. Banana exports peaked 
the transition in 1930, but they rapidly declined 
afterv.'ard . "Thousand of workers were laid off, and the 
wages of those remaining on the job were reduced, as were 
t;,he prices paid t.o independent banana producers by the 
giant fruit companies. Strikes and other labor 
disturbances began to break out in response to these 
conditions ... 18 
The world-wide eoonomio crisis of the 1930's obviously 
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led to increased hardship for workers on the banana 
plantations. It is important to explore their economic 
circumstances including their bargaining power, their 
hourly wage rates and benefits. For if Paige's theory is 
correct that non-cultivators dependent on capital and 
cultivators dependent on wages (typical of plantation 
economies) focus their conflicts on questions of wages 
and working conditions, then the relative stability of 
Honduras during this era may have been the result of 
legal trade union activities. At the same time, if 
workers were unable to unionize and secure nominal 
benefi ts, then the stability in Honduras must be 
accounted for by considering other facets of the Honduran 
political and economic structure. 
The Economic Conditions of Workers on the Banana 
Plantations 1900-1945 
Sources indicate that wages varied in Honduras with 
each fruit company. The determination of wages seemed to 
rest to a considerable extent with officials in each 
region. "During 1922 the average monthly earnings per 
laborer in a new Honduran district, to which it was 
necessary to attract workers, amounted to about $45.00 a 
month. During 1925, however, in another Honduran 
district where labor was more plentiful, the average 
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month earn per laborer were less than $24.00, ,,19 
1929 v{ere estimated to be approximately 
$1. 50-2.00 a day in Honduras, but, there were 
variations according to ion, 20 The wage st.ati ics 
v;,bieb are lable seem to show that, banana were 
paid more than icultural 1 The average wage 
of farm laborers. including coffee workers, in ot.her 
Central American countries was approximately 50 cents per 
day.21 Before 1930 sources indi that the United Fru 
Company on the average paid a higher wage than other 
landed propriet,ors and coffee finqueros. An inspector of 
t;he treasury cribed the situation of field laborers in 
1930 as 110ws: 
Average wages: These prices f 
ing to the zones and t,he circumstances; 
recent and because of the fall of coffee, 
wages so fallen in the coffee zones. In 
cold and temperate cl the field laborers 
rece a whi fluctuates between 25 and 
50 cents, but they receive in addition certain 
other advantages such as free housing, firewood 
and medicines. It is also custom 
agricultural ises to provide 
their , as complementary to their 
salar ,a dai ly rat.ion, which cons ists of 
Indian corn (the principal article of food of 
the national laborers), black beans, salt, 
coffee, etc. The estates which have vast lands 
are accustomed to provide the res peons 
cert.ain extensions of land whiRA t;hey can 
cultivate maize for themselves.~l 
Aft.er 1930 the United Fruit company severly slashed 
All "salaries were cut 10!7~ on the first of the 
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following July. with salaries over $5,000 receiving a 15% 
reduction. 23 Though these wage cuts led to discontent and 
strikes in Honduras, it must be noted that the reduced 
wages were equivalent to the wage of t.he average 
agricultural worker. "On coffee fincas visited in 1931 
and 1932 workers made daily 37 to 50 cents, while 
particularly fast pickers earned from 50 cents to 
$1.00 ... 24 Banana workers received higher salaries "than 
those which prevailed for similar kinds of labor, but 
they lost their individual bargaining power in times of 
unemployment and labor surplus. ,,25 
The reduction in wages after 1930 caused many strikes 
on Honduran banana plantations, but they were rapidly 
suppressed with the aid of government troops. Honduran 
workers had been organizing and striking since 1920, but 
the government and private enterprises failed to legally 
recognize trade union organizations. The sporadic 
walkouts failed to achieve the desired benefits because 
,the majority of Honduran laborers were conservative. In 
addition, United Fruit employed various tact,ics 
diminish labor solidarity. They often 
concentrated on the sections where the 
workers were the least restive, persuading some 
to return to work, and started the trains 
moving, thus eventually breaking the morale of 
the strikers. The company also played Negroes 
and Central Americans against each.other, thus 
preventing any common opposition. 26 
to 
10]. 
Sources27 indicate that. the strikes of 1931 1932 
were difficult to disentangle because many of the active 
1 belonged t,o communist groups. Worker 
sol idari ty in comparison ,,"as weak because large 
majority of did not, bel to communist 
organ.i.zat.ions. 
Honduran banana companies and government 
failed to recognize worker organizations dur this 
, some other factor must account for the relative 
stability of Honduras. One possible explanation could be 
land availability. Paige emphasizes the importance 
land in his study suggests "that the greater the 
of 1 as a source of income for cultivators, 
the greater their avoidance of ri and the greater their 
resistance to revolutionary poli t.ical t .. ?8 movemen s .... 
Though "the six largest banana concessions had been 
granted 415,500 (one 2.47 acres) of 
fert;i Ie land '"'9 eve of V-Jor ld War 1," t:::.. thes e 1 ands 
were in areas where malaria and a lack of infrastructure 
had prevented farmers from cultivat plots of land. 
Traditional landholding remained largely 
.30 In other a.reas land remained readi lable 
and relatively inexpensive. Sources indicate that a 
manzana of land (.69 heetares) cost only about, two 
for a common agricultural laborer in Honduras. 31 In 
addition banana plantations co-existed comfortably with 
cattle raising and subsistence agriculture. 32 By 1930 the 
population had increased to 854,000 but peasants "were 
still able to find as many as 35 to 70 contiguous 
hectares of unoccupied national land to cultivate ... 33 
Furthermore, land legislation in Honduras benefitted the 
peasantry. Two agrarian laws were particularly 
significant. In 1924 the role of agriculture was held to 
be vital to the nation's progress and an agrarian law was 
passed which was incorporated into the constitution of 
Honduras. This la,,", provided for a free donation of land 
in family lots. "The 50 acres or 20 hectare plots 
granted to each family was a free donation and was 
exempted from all municipal taxes. However, land was not 
allowed to be scld and could be transferred only by 
inheritance. To obtain full title, a house must have 
been constructed, at least half of the land cultivated, 
and a 10-year residence established ... 34 
In 1928 this law was amended and it exempted all 
agricultural workers 
renting, purchasing, or receiving free 
national land from compulsory military service 
and fiscal taxes. They were also allowed to 
import duty·-free machines and tools for 
agriculture and cattle raising, gas and crude 
oil, dynamite, construction materials, blood~g 
animals, seeds, insecticides, medicines, etc. 
In 1935 dictator 'I'iburcio Carias Andino introduced a 
1 OL~. 
rural oolonization plan with expressed purpose of 
intensifying and improving agriculture. was hoped 
t.hat desirable imrrdgrant oolonists would take advantage 
free 50 aore lots and the gratuitous supplying 
-t.ools, animals, f3 etc., by government as soon as 
the immig:rants began 
eland lav?s 
.. 36 a oolony. 
importance 
agriculture in Honduras. 1941-42, while researching 
Honduras" land laws, William ,,,,rote: 
While exact statistics are not lable, a 
conservati ve estirnate wou indicate that at 
least. 75 percent of all Hondurans are 
landow'ners; and the entire population, 
including the poorest elements, are definitely 
eligible for possession of national land 
suitable for agriculture and cattle s 
Individual landownersh has been a cohes 
social force even during turbulent past 
hist.ory of at the present. time 
the ~asis stable political 
. t" "=1/ organlza lon. -.' 
The ready availability of land in Hondtlras does fact 
appear to be an explanation the political stability 
during this period. land continued to be 
lable vlas that no other of export agriculture 
developed '!?hieh competed w.it,h banana enclave econcmy 
prior to 1950. one-half of Honduras' farmland 
was private 
technol ically 
relat . 1 1S0 .... 
backward cattlemen 
ions. These 
cont.inued to 
who 1 
rural e1 
continued to live close to their land "often not socially 
distinct from neighboring semi-subsistence farmers ... 38 In 
add ion, they were politically and economically the 
weakest rural obligarchy in 
continued to be divided among 
Central America. They 
themselves because of 
partisan attachments. "Honduran governments, t,herefore, 
basically represented the interests of the North American 
banana companies and of whichever political faction was 
dominant at the moment rather then the interests of the 
cattlemen as a \I{hole ... 39 
The Post 1945 Economy of Honduras 
In the post-World War II era the economic structure of 
Honduras experienced a transformation. Capitalist 
production expanded beyond the narrow confines of banana 
exports. Bananas remained the principal export but they 
began to decline in relative importance. 40 "Stimulated by 
international demand and favorable credits on the part of 
the government, an important agrarian bourgeois nucleus 
began to emerge out of the exploits of cattle and 
cotton. A small and rural bourgeoisie also began to form 
around the coffee industry, .. 41 In the midst of these 
changes t,he banana companies began to lose some of their 
powers as "unchallengeable arbitrators of Honduran 
political life and sole creditors of the state ... 42 These 
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changes in Honduras were similar to the changes in the 
Central American region as a whole. If we reconsider 
Nicaragua, 
cultivation 
its post-war expansion included the 
of cotton. This expansion of cotton 
precipitated the displacement of many peasant farmers and 
led to a considerable decline in subsistence farming. In 
Honduras cotton, coffee and cattle production began to 
increase. Three important questions arise about this new 
expansion: first, approximately how much land area was 
involved in cotton and coffee cultivation? Did land 
continue to be readily 
or did the peasantry 
available for peasant subsis'tence 
face economic conditions, including 
landlessness, similar to that of the Nicaraguan 
peasantry? Lastly, did peasant subsistence co-exist with 
the new forms of capitalist expansion or was a large 
labor force required as was the case in Nicaragua with 
the expansion of cotton? 
changes which occurred in 
be taken into account. 
In addition to these questions, 
the banana enclaves must also 
If labor achieved any major 
gains, such as the institution of unions and the right to 
collecti ve bargaining" then these changes may provide an 
explanation of the relative stability of Honduras in the 
post-war era. 
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New Export Agriculture: Cotton~ Coffee and Livestock 
The growth of commercial agriculture in the post-war 
era contributed to the problem of landlessness. As 
coffee, cotton and beef became important exports the new 
rural export elites associated with these sectors 
(predominantly cotton and cattle)43 "began to expand 
their landholdings by means of an enclosure movement that 
displaced thousands of peasants. ,,44 In the years between 
1950 and 1965 the number of hectares planted in cotton 
expanded from 1,205 to 18,199. 45 The cotton zones were 
located in Choluteca and other parts of southern Honduras 
and they were the most densely populated agricultural 
areas. As the cotton zones expanded this created intense 
land pressures because cattle farming was expanding in 
the same region. In the years between 1952 and 1965 
pasturage expanded by 300,000 hectares to accommodate the 
larger livestock population. 46 With the new profits in 
livestock and cotton and the increased value of land, 
large landowners evicted tenants and 
squatters and absorbed thousands of hectares of 
national and ejidal land often by simply 
fencing them in with barbed wire. Peasants who 
could still find plots to rent discovered that 
rents had risen dramatically due to the 
increasing value of agricultural land. 
Conflicts between peasants and large landowners 
became more frequent, and Honduran peasants 
began to organi~7 to resist the enlargement of 
the latifundia. 4 
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As the population continued to grow during the 1970's 
at a rate of 3%, the increased production of beef and 
sugar exports caused land pressures to intensify. 48 
Fortunately the decline in cotton prices halted the land 
absorbing cotton industry, and coffee and bananas were 
not involved in land enclosure drives. Nevertheless the 
increased population and the expansion of commercial 
agricultural production created a land shortage problem. 
Table 4.1 on the following page gives some indication of 
the land shortage problem in the 1970's. In 1974 the 
table suggests that landlessness affected approximately 
36% of rural families. When both landlessness and 
landpoor (under 1 hectare) microfinca families are added 
together, the percentage of the rural population 
suffering from extreme land scarcity equals 47% in 
Honduras. When the microfinca category is expanded to 
include farms of up to a more comparable 1.61 hectares, 
the landless and land poor percentage rises to 55 % 49 of 
the Honduran rural population. 50 
Land Reform 
Some authors51 argue that this problem of landlessness 
became as acute in other Central American countries. 
Other authors dispute this notion and suggest there are 
distinct factors which make the Honduran situation 
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Table 4.1. Landlessness and Land Poverty Among Rural Families 
in Honduras, 1974 
Land Holdings 
Landless 
Under 1 Hectare 
1 to 2 Hectares 
2 to 5 Hectares 
5 to 10 Hectares 
10 Hectares Plus 
Total 
Number of 
Rural Families 
108,621 
33,771 
38,650 
52,360 
28,.264 
42,296 
303,962 
Percentage of 
Rural Families 
36 
11 
13 
17 
9 
14 
100 
Source: Table adapted from J. Mark Ruhl, "Agrarian 
Structure and Political Stability in Honduras, " 
Journal of Interamerican Studies and "arId 
Affairs, 26:1 (February 1984), p. 36. 
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different. 52 
One factor which Ruhl stresses is the survival of the 
ejidos. 53 These lands were significant because "they were 
regarded as owned. Families controlled inheritance 
rights to them and peasants who worked the ejidos also 
retained private ownership of their houses, permanent 
crops, and other improvements. ,,54 Though the commercial 
expansion of the 1950's and 1960's contributed to the 
loss of thousands of hectares in ejidal landholdings, 
peasant resistance to these land enclosures mounted and 
ejidal landholdings began to stabilize after 1966. Also, 
the Honduran government recovered many of the illegally 
enclosed lands and expanded the national public land 
available for farming. 
A second factor of importance was the implementation of 
agrarian reforms in the years 1962, 1972 and 1975 which 
were limited in their actual distribution of land but 
which absorbed some of the peasants' demands and 
prevented major discontent. The Honduran reform program 
was stimulated by peasants who began to voice their 
protests as they were being squeezed by a rising 
population and expanding commercial agriculture. To 
demand land reform they created several strong 
organizations. Honduran peasants were the strongest and 
best organized campesinos in Central America. Ruhl 
suggests there were two reasons why: 
(1) they were permitted to organize legally 
while peasant groups in EI Salvador and 
elsewhere were outlawed and\or repressed, and, 
(2) they received assistance and inspiration 
from the Honduran banana worker's unions 
organizgd in the 1950's and from the Catholio 
Churoh. 5 
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I suggest that there is a third reason why peasants 
were suooessful in their efforts at organizing and 
demanding land reform. If we re-examine Paige's theory 
he suggests that an upper class whioh is weak is foroed 
to "olose off all avenues of sooial action exoept violent 
resistanoe ... 56 He suggests that an upper class dependent 
on oapital is the most stable sinoe it oan meet the 
pressures for ohange and is willing to share some of its 
net gain with the agrioultural working olass. Unlike the 
upper class in Nicaragua the upper class in Honduras was 
not dependent on land. Cotton expansion was limited and 
the banana oompanies did not seek to expand into new 
territory. 
The initial agrarian reform program had been 
promulgated in 1962 but little land was distributed until 
two peasant organizations had been established in the 
late 1960's. These were the National Association of 
Honduran Peasants (ANACH)57 and the militant National 
Peasants Union (UNC). In the late 1960's the ANACH and 
the UNC began to foster peasant land invasions. In 
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addition, the Instituto Nacional Agrario (INA), which had 
been created in 1962 under the leadership of Rigoberto 
Sandoval Corea, supported peasant claims to retake 
national lands. In 1969 the INA evicted Salvadorean 
peasants from national lands while thousands of other 
Salvadoreans fled when the war between Honduras and EI 
Salvador broke out. During the war the Honduran peasants 
demonstrated their patriotism, and despite pleas from 
large landowners, the "Honduran military units became 
less willing to oust them from lands that had been 
invaded ... 58 
Land reform accelerated greatly in 
populist military regime of General 
1971-72 under the 
Oswaldo Lopez 
Arellano. He showed a progressive interest in land reform 
and supported Sandoval Corea's actions in the INA, even 
though this displeased the rural oligarchy. He was 
anxious to diffuse peasant discontent. He issued Decree 
Law Number 8, which obliged landlords to rent unused land 
to peasants. In 1975 a more comprehensive land reform 
law, Decree Law Number 70, attempted to make more land 
available for redistribution by specifying agricultural 
efficiency criteria and farm size ceilings for private 
landholdings. "Expropriation and compensation mechanisms 
were codified with the purpose of transferring some of 
the large areas of poorly used land from large landowners 
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to needy peasants ... 59 In 1975 Lop~z was deposed by an 
internal coup, but agrarian reform continued to move 
quickly until 1977. The extent of land distribution 
carried out through the agrarian reform program can be 
seen in Table 4.2. The table indicates that the period 
from 1973 to 1976 was the program's most productive 
period. Over 31,000 peasant families received land. 
An important question about the agrarian reform program 
is whether it had a significant impact on the pattern of 
land tenure and rural politics? According to Ruhl the 
reform "represented the distribution of 8% of Honduras' 
total farmland to roughly 12% of its total rural families 
in 1980 ... 60 After 1980 some peasants left the agrarian 
reform projects because they found the land allotments 
were too poor or too distant from markets. Others left 
because of conflicts within their rural communities. Out 
of a total of 36% of landless families the agrarian 
reform affected 22% of the number of landless and land 
poor families. 61 
In studying the land reform distribution in Honduras 
many authors have posited that its impact was of 
relatively little significance. 62 Critics argue "that it 
did little to alter the basic inequalities of the 
Honduran agrarian structure ... 63 Ruhl suggest.s that its 
significance should not be overestimated but points out 
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Table 4.2. Land Distribution Under the Honduran Agrarian 
Reform Program, 1962-79. 
Years 
1962--72 
1973--74 
1975-76 
1977 9 
Total 
:Ii of Initial 
Families 
9,076 
18,1502 
13,025 
2,906 
46,890 
:Ii of Hectares 
35,961 
79,552 
64,165 
11,770 
207,433 
Source: Adapted from tables in J. Mark Ruhl, "Agrarian 
Structure and Political Stability in Honduras, " 
pp. 53-54. 
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that it did secure land for many poor rural families who 
would have been faced with far more ' • 1 G.lsma.l.. ives 
had the projects not been The agrarian 
reform pro were also symbolically significant. 
Campes who fought return of their lands won 
disputes against vehemently opposed private landowners. 
This gave the Honduran government a very progressive 
image. The mil was also instrumental in helping the 
campesinos secure ir 1 .. 1;lhioh d.emonstrat,ed c1ea1'1;),. 
were not the con,tl~ol of rural 
01 64 
Trade Unions 
In addition to the land program" Honduran 
ilit:':l in t~he postwar period can also be accounted 
cons role of 1 1;4hen Tiburcio Andino's 
administration ended in 1954 it left a pol ical vacuu.m 
and allowed "the emergence of new power contenders 
began to challenge the political leadership of the 
Nati 6 t:: party." ;J These politi contenders 
included" 
the Honduran armed 
achieve a certain 
itutionalization 
forces ,qhich 
primitive 
t,he 
began to 
level of 
ing of U. S. 
Also it was a peri military 
during whi 
began to 
working and Ie classes 
emerge as power contenders, 
part.icularly -the wake of the massive banana 
worker's strike of 1954. 66 
In 1954 a series of strikes broke out against the 
United Fruit Company operations on Honduras' North 
Coast. 67 The strike spread to include the Standard Fruit 
Company operations and brought the banana industry to a 
near standstill. The strikers presented a list of 
grievances which included, "wages, working conditions, 
the right to collective bargaining, medical benefits, and 
overtime pay ... 68 Despite efforts to suppress the strike 
the government and fruit companies were forced to 
recognize some of the demands. Although the original 
demands were not fully met, the strike marked a major 
turning point for Honduras' labor movement. The power of 
the fruit companies was curtailed, "wages went up 10-15%, 
some conditions were improved and a Workers Union of the 
Tela Railroad (SITRATERCO) was recognized, replete 
with the most conservative members of the Central Strike 
Committee on its executive board ... 69 
Though the banana companies began to use labor saving 
devices after the strike of 1954 and the number of 
workers declined from 26,456 -to 13,284 (by 1957), banana 
laborers continued to be an important sector of 
agricultural laborers who were relatively prosperous. 70 
When we consider the stability of Honduras, we must take 
into account these agricultural laborers v/ho represent 
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10,600 rural families and compose 10% of the landless 
rural population. 71 Sources note that the unionization of 
these banana workers resulted in increased wages 
approximately 10 times the national average income. 72 
In sum, political discontent in Honduras has remained 
relatively low in comparison to Nicaragua (and other 
Central American countries). Honduran peasants continue 
to have adequate landholdings or have access to well-paid 
agricultural work on the banana plantations. The 
campesinos have a measure of independence since they 
continue to control their lands and owe nothing to 
private landlords. In addition, support for revolution 
seems unlikely because Hondurans have suffered less from 
land shortages and land tenure insecurity. As noted by 
Dorner and Quiros, the banana industry and its expansion 
only serves to benefit labor in such economies. "A 
typical family on a small farm could increase its 
earnings substantially by working in a banana plantation 
rather than cultivating its own land ... 73 Since the upper 
class is dependent on capital, not land, the banana 
industry provides services and amenities not readily 
available to other small farmers. The number of landless 
is also reasonably low if the banana worker's families 
are subtracted from the landless total. As Rubl notes, 
an accurate estimation of land shortage and rural poverty 
after banana workers are deleted falls from 36% to 32% of 
landless families and the total percentage of landless 
and land poor in rural Honduras falls from 55% to 51%.74 
This may not seem like an enormous decline, but, as Ruhl 
suggests, not all rural families were in desperate need 
of or interested in acquiring land. 75 
With an overview of the Honduran economy it is 
important to come to some general conclusions about 
whether revolutionary change based on peasant, support 
could occur in Honduras. If Paige's theory is correct the 
evidence in this chapter would suggest such a revolution 
is not an immediate possibility. In Chapter five Paige's 
theory will be evaluated further in terms of its 
effectiveness in explaining the Nicaraguan revolution. 
If the conditions Paige describes in his theory are 
compatible with the conditions in pre-revolutionary 
Nicaragua, then we can be more confident that Paige's 
theory may also provide an explanation for the relative 
stability of Honduras. 
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Chapter Five 
CONCLUSION 
With the overview in the previous two chapters of the 
economic and political conditions in Nicaragua and 
Honduras during the twentieth century, this chapter 
returns to our examination of the propositions outlined 
in Chapter Two. Since this thesis has focused on Jeffery 
Paige's theory of revolution and the specific internal 
conditions which can help account for agrarian 
revolutions, it is important to evaluate the emphasis he 
places on the three variables of cash crops, land tenure 
system and the class configuration which is derived from 
particular modes of production. In the first section of 
this chapter I will attempt to evaluate Paige's theory by 
reintroducing the first four propositions and testing 
them using the Nicaraguan and Honduran case studies. If 
the conditions outlined in these propositions are present 
! 
in the Nicaraguan case study and found to be absent in 
the Honduran example, then Paige's theory would have 
support from a cross-national, comparative perspective. 
In the second section of this chapter, I will examine 
proposition five which suggests that the Sandinistas 
should have received their greatest support from those 
areas where the export market forced a change in the land 
tenure system and sharecropping or migratory estates 
became the dominant pattern of land tenure. If this 
proposition is supported in the Nicaraguan case, then 
Paige's theory would be relatively useful in explaining 
the pattern of revolutionary activity within a society. 
Paige;s Theory: A Comparison of Nicaragua and Honduras 
Does Paige's theory help explain revolutionary change 
in Nicaragua and the relative stability in Honduras? If 
the propositions derived from Paige's theory are not 
supported by the evidence, the theory may need some 
modification. 
According to proposition one, Nicaragua should have 
experienced, and Honduras should not have experienced: 
(1) A significant change in the export sector 
which should have resul t,ed in land having a 
very high rate of productivity and a high 
market price. This change in the export 
economy should have resulted in the upper class 
becoming increasingly dependent on land. 
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In the case of Nicaragua, the evidence is consistent 
with expectations (see table 5.1). The post-1950 economy 
of Nicaragua experienced a shift to cotton production and 
the increased demand for cotton required the clearing of 
haciendas as modern infrastructure was to be laid in 
place. The process also resulted in the clearing of 
peasants from national lands called ejidos. The rapid 
expansion was in response to high prices which were 
facilitated by the state, which was taking a more active 
role in the accumulation process, "especially through 
road construction and extensive, subsidized credit 
provided by the National Bank". 1 As Biderman notes, 
higher productivity of both land and labor 
were also important sources of growth, and 
these were also facilitated by credit and other 
government activities which stimulated the use 
of agrochemical inputs and new seeds as well as 
investment in labor-saving machinery. By the 
mid-fifties, cotton growers were receiving 
two-thirds of the value of all bank credit for 
crops, and the proportion of cotton area 
covered by credit was by far the highest for 
any crop. It is important to note in passing 
that the liberal and subsidized credit policy 
was based on the ~~ ynd~~ Qyltivation and led 
to a considerable over-expansio~ into lands not 
suitable for cotton production. 
In the case of Honduras we find that proposition is not 
confirmed. The post-1950 era did evidence some changes 
in Honduras which included the expansion of commercial 
crops such as cotton, coffee and some cattle farming, but 
the proportion of land which was devoted to the export 
12). 
Table 5.1. Changes Export Crop ion In Nicaragua 
Ni 
1950 
1979 
1950 
1979 
and Honduras, 1950-1979 
hectares; 
Tota1 
arable 
1 
769 
1.,511 
810 
L 757 
Cotton 
174 
c~ 
13 
(measured in ands 
Coffee Sugar Bananas 
63 o 
130 41 23* 
56 14 61 
85 75 43 
* This sta.ti c represents area harvested in bananas 
1978. The st.atistic 1979 vias not avail Ie. 
Table is based on information from Dennis T. 
Avery, Central America: Agriculture; Technology. 
and Unrest (Washington: Dept. of State Bulletin, 
,January 1985), p.3; FAO Production Yearbook 
1965 19(Rome: Food and Agriculture Organization 
of the United Nations, 1966); Economic Commission 
Latin America, New York, 1981 and James D. 
Rudolph, ( ) Honduras: A Country Study, 
(Washington: GPO Foreign Area Studies, The 
American Un i ty, 1984). 
sector was small in comparison to Nicaragua. Unlike 
Nicaragua, Honduras also had very progressive land laws 
which reserved the ejidos (communal lands) for many small 
farmers and peasants. The export of bananas also 
continued to dominate Honduras and "did not change the 
productive structures that had been previously formed, 
nor did it alter the configuration of the dominant 
classes".3 This is because banana production did not 
require significant amounts of land to be extracted from 
the traditional sector. 
According to the second proposition agrarian 
revolutions are likely when: 
(2) The change in the export sector also 
results in an increasing shift to a 
sharecropper or migratory labor economy based 
on coffee, grapes, rice, cotton or other 
commodi t;ies which are highly-labor intensive 
and which have a period of production of one 
year or less and a short harvest period of two 
to four months duration. 
The change in the export sector in the post-war economy 
of Nicaragua confirms both of Paige's expectations in 
this proposition. First, the export sector did become 
highly concentrated in cotton cultivation (and to some 
degree there was an expansion of rice cultivation4 ). For 
cotton the period of production is less than one year and 
the harvesting period is between December and February. 
Second, land -tenure changes occurred which resulted in a 
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landless migrant labor force. In the pre-World War II 
economy, coffee production was dominated by 
non-capitalist relations as peasant households vfere given 
access to plots of land within the coffee haciendas. The 
expansion of cotton in the 1950" sand 1960' s brought 
about the massive displacement of the peasantry in the 
Pacific region as tenants and sharecroppers were expelled 
in great numbers. During the major harvest periods for 
cotton, coffee and sugar, many peasant families who had 
been forced to migrate to frontier areas in search of 
plots for subsistence agriculture often joined the 
migrant labor force and migrated back for the harvest 
periods because of unemployment or underemployment. 5 
The expansion of cotton contributed to a migratory 
labor force which reduced permanent labor requirements. 
"Tenure institutions made it simple to divest campesinos 
of land for large-scale production of cotton. ,,6 The 
fact that most cotton producers were not 
landowners but investors simplified the 
severing of ties or claims which might have 
developed. Many independent campesinos, 
lacking financial resources or technical 
know-how, had to rent their land or join the 
expansion on a modest scale. 7 
Approximately 52.3 percent8 of the land devoted to 
cotton was rented. Cotton was overwhelmingly 
concentrated in large productive units which averaged 
over 500 hectares. 9 Although only 2 percent of the total 
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number of farms were this large, they occupied 40% of the 
agricultural land of the west. 10 
The cotton expansion was also characterized by some 
capital intensive techniques. This requires comment 
because Paige's theory suggests there should be reduced 
chances for revolution as the upper class becomes more 
dependent on capital. In Nicaragua, cotton expansion saw 
the rise of mechanical cotton pickers. "From 1963 to 
1967, the number of mechanical cotton pickers rose from 
13 to 200. In 1967, over 20 percent of the cotton crop 
was harvested mechanically, with average cost per unit 45 
percent lower than that picked by hand ... 11 
It can be inferred then that the development of cotton 
production along more capital intensive lines has reduced 
t.he capacity of the export sector to absorb labor. 
Secondly, while capital intensity has diminished} the 
relative need for permanent labor it has intensified the 
need for seasonal labor. During the harvest periods 
labor requirements increase for cotton production. This 
results in short term employment for many migratory 
laborers. This change has resulted in decreased 
employment security for large numbers in the rural labor 
force. 
Paige associates capital intensive agriculture with 
stable plantation systems: as agricultural income expands 
through capital intensive techniques and worker movements 
can be directed into reformist channels by the offering 
of small wage gains at little cost to the employer. In 
Nicaragua, however, the situation with cotton is 
different. Mechanical cotton pickers expanded the income 
of the cotton producer by replacing the costs of a 
permanent labor force, but at some point, the cotton 
producer's income becomes fixed. The mechanical cotton 
pickers allow him to increase productivity but this 
eventually levels off. This is primarily because the 
expansion of cotton requires an expanding land base and 
in order to increase his income he would have to possess 
more land. If he fails to expand his land base he will 
remain at a fixed or declining income depending on the 
world market price for cotton. These characteristics 
suggest that cotton production perpetuates increased 
landlessness for the rural population and forces more and 
more peasants to migrate and accept scant wages for 
seasonal work. 
In Honduras,the evidence does not indicate a shift to a 
sharecropper or migratory labor economy based on rice, 
cotton, coffee or grapes. Table 5.1 indicates that the 
amount of land devoted to cotton in Honduras was very 
small in comparison "to Nicaragua. Honduras' cotton 
cultivation expanded in the post-1950 era to include 
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13,000 hectares of land, less than one percent of arable 
land. Nicaragua in contrast saw an expansion of 157,000 
hectares of land, 12 more than ten percent of its arable 
land, Honduras continued to be dominated by banana 
exports, coffee plantations and an increase in the 
livestock industry. 
According to the third proposition, agrarian 
revolutions are associated with: 
(3) A peasantry increasingly stripped of its 
land and forced to assume the role of wage 
laborer, either as a sharecropper or migratory 
laborer. 
In Nicaragua)this is evidenced with the expansion of 
cotton cultivation and the increase in irrigated rice 
production. While coffee production in the pre-World War 
II economy co-existed with subsistence farming, cotton 
production required the clearing of land. The 
accelerated employment of machinery and technical inputs 
and the seasonalization of the labor process 
culminated in the expropriation of land from 
peasantry. As Winson notes, the 
specific form of this process introduced a 
marked degree of impermanence into the labor 
process and thus an important element of 
transciency into the regimen of the 
agricultural labor force. What we are speaking 
of, then, is the development of a mobile rural 
proletariat in recent years, one that must be 
distinguished from the rural population that 
has long participated in the old established 
all 
the 
cycle involving a patterned yearly migration 
from the minifundio economy to the commercial 
farms and then reabsorption by subsistence 
agriculture. Rather, this is a migratory rural 
population that has largel13 become detached from subsistence production. 
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The evidence provided by the example of cotton as an 
agro-export in Nicaragua suggests that it may be even 
more exploitive than Paige's main example of irrigated 
rice. Paige's argument rests on the assumption that when 
the peasant is forced to make a transition to 
sharecropper or landless migratory laborer he becomes 
more disenchanted with the system and may seek 
revolutionary alternatives. The example of cotton in 
Nicaragua suggests that the transition from sharecropper 
to landless wage laborer may also involve a further step 
which increases revolutionary sentiment among landless 
wage laborers. In Nicaragua greater mechanization 
contributed to a pattern of longer periods of 
unemployment between harvests. Agricultural laborers 
were forced to travel long distances "seeking wage work 
during harvest and migrated almost continuously between 
harvests looking for any sort of employment ... 14 The 
increased technology put the wage laborer in a more 
insecure position--the limited employment opportunities 
during harvest seasons were not enough to secure 
subsistence requirements. 
In contrast to Nicaragua. the peasantry in Honduras did 
1JO. 
not experience such severe land expropriat;ion and the 
proletarianizat,ion process was not, in the 
post-1950 economy. As noted in table 5.1, cash cropping 
d e in Honduras in the post-1950 era. although 
not as qui as in Nicaragua and not in the same 
crops. Still, t,he cash crops expansion in Honduras did 
threaten istence farmers and had two major negative 
consequences: 15 
first it drove up the purohase and rental 
priee of land ... second the commercial estates 
threatened to absorb the various non-pri vat,a 
t,enure (ejidos, national land, etc.) 
~\lhat et thif] pressure to some extent, Honduras 
v"as Honduras' land reform. With the help of the 
ociac.ion Naci Carnpesinos de Honduras (ANACH) and 
the Union Nacional de Campes (UNC), Honduran peasants 
had a well organized movement. land enclosures. 
Reform inst in 1962, 1972 and 1975 allowed 
207,433 hectares of land to be 
In on ,to t,hese reforms" its must be remembered 
that banana plant,ations continued to employ a relat 
large sector population Honduras. These wage 
1 were Ie to unionize and secure adequate 
benef and majority of rural 
d Vie 11 ers were 1 farmers ",rho ,,,,orked their own plots, 
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or landless laborers who worked for wages on estates or 
small farms. Others were campesinos who owned land but 
worked part-time on seasonal harvests to supplement their 
incomes. Although land scarcity had become a serious 
problem, the majority of landless peasants were not 
forced to work on rented land because communal lands 
continued to be available. 
As in Nicaragua, large landowners in Honduras had 
attempted to enclose more and more land after 1960 and 
the number of landless grew by thousands. One author 
notes that as the number of landless and land-poor 
families rose to over 50 percent, conflicts between 
peasants and large landowners forced campesinos to begin 
to organize politically, thus becoming a major interest 
group with considerable political clout ... 16 
According to the four·th proposit.ion, agrarian 
revolutions are associated with a political atmosphere in 
which there is: 
(4) An economically weak upper class 
unwilling to grant any political or economic 
concessions and dependent on legal or 
extralegal force for its economic survival. 
The upper class in Nicaragua included Somoza's family 
and private financial groups such as the Banco 
Nicaraguense. The country's banks and other credit 
institutions were controlled both by the Somoza group and 
by domestic and foreign interests. They 
were little more than conduits for foreign 
capital, having almost no financial resources 
of their own. An important contradiction 
between the Somoza group and other financial 
interests was inherent in the credit system as 
the level of indebtedness in 1978 was about 
half a billion dollars with the Somoza groy~ 
owing a large part of this debt to the banks. 
This upper class also included cotton growers. They 
increasingly dominated the process of cotton production 
and organized into powerful regional associations, 
"through which they exerted considerable influence over 
the allocation of state resources and on state policies 
and institutions ... 18 
This pre-revolutionary Nicaraguan system depended on 
the monopoly of force by Somoza's National Guard and 
police. "Political parties, workers unions .• peasant 
associations and other mass organizations that might 
press for better wages and working conditions or for 
greater access to land, were held tightly in check as was 
competition from business and professional groups not in 
line with the Somoza's clique's interests ... 19 
In sum, the Nicaraguan evidence is consistent with 
proposition four. An economically weak upper class was 
clearly evidenced in the pre-revolutionary period and 
this elite depended on extra-legal force, namely the 
National Guard, to defend its interests. 
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In Honduras -I::.he upper class was more dependent on 
commercial and industrial capital and was therefore more 
able to share increases in income with wage laborers. 
The elite was not dependent solely on land or on 
extra-legal force. The workers in Honduras won the right 
t,o form unions after the strike of 1954 and a Latin 
American labor organization sympathetic to and assisted 
by the United States intervened with the government on 
behalf of the workers. "As a result of this successful 
intervention ORIT (Organizacion Regional Interamerican de 
Trabajadores) ,qas granted an icial monopoly on the 
right to organize all workers in the 
did with large amounts of aid from 
government and labor federations ... 20 
country, which it 
the United States 
In conclusion, for all four propositions, the evidence 
for Nicaragua 
Paige's theory 
and Honduras is as expected. Apparently, 
can help account for the agrarian 
revolution in Nicaragua and the relative stabil in 
Honduras during the 1960's and 1970's. 
Paige's Theory: A Comparison or Regions Within Nicaragua 
In this section I will re-introduce proposition five 
and compare regions within Nicaragua in order to test 
Paige's hypothesized correlation between sharecropping or 
migrant labor and radicalism. This proposition suggests 
that there should have been 
(5) Greater support for the Sandinistas where 
sharecropping or migratory estates were the 
predominant land tenure system. 
1)4. 
On first examination, the Pacific zone with its high 
concentration of cotton cultivation and increased 
population density should have been the area where the 
Sandinistas received their greatest support. Instead, 
support for the Sandinistas began and was most pronounced 
in zone two, the north central Highlands. John A. Booth 
suggests that the high population density and relatively 
open terrain of the Pacific zone did not allow a 
permanent guerrilla presence. 21 Other groups such as the 
ATC (Asociacion de Trabajadores del Campo) and CEPA 
activists became closely aligned with the FSLN and were 
instrumental in organizing the peasantry in the Pacific 
zone. In addition since interests of the large 
capitalists coincided with the interests of the National 
Guard, suppression of organizational efforts by the 
National Guard in this region became commonplace. 
By contrast, the rugged terrain and scattered 
population of the north-central Highlands facilitated 
guerrilla activity. Booth also believes that the 
territory held a strong allegiance to the hero Sandino in 
the 1930's and this may have been the reason the FSLN 
received strong support in the 1960's and 1970's. 22 
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While the above explanations seem plausible, there may 
have been a more concrete' reason why peasants of the 
North Central Highlands allowed the permanent presence of 
the FSLN in their territory and supported and joined 
their organization. The explanation m~y lie in the 
post-1950 coffee expansion which left many farmers and 
smallholders landless peasants. Coffee expansion in the 
Highlands produced conditions similar to cotton expansion 
in the Pacific zone. In addition those peasants who had 
been driven out of the Pacific zone and settled in the 
Highlands faced chronic unemployment. Many were forced 
into migratory labor once in the Highlands and one 
possible theory may be that they migrated back to the 
Pacific zone during the cotton harvest and constituted a 
floating labor reserve. The migrant laborers in the 
Pacific Zone were forced to live in temporary quarters 
and were offered low wages and seasonal employment. If 
migratory laborers were from the Highlands they were at 
the mercy of the cotton producers since increased coffee 
cultivation could not absorb the increasing population in 
their region. Their only alternative was migrating and 
accepting employment during the harvest season of major 
cash crops. 
The conditions discussed above 
theory. The resulting migratory 
coincide 
economy 
with 
and 
Paige's 
seasonal 
employment in the Central Highlands may have forced many 
peasants to contend with insecure conditions. As Paige's 
theory predicts, this also forced the elite to rely on 
extra-legal force and excessive repression. In a recent 
article Paige found that migratory laborers of the 
Pacific Central regions formed the base of support for 
revolutionary activity in Guatemala. The areas to which 
migratory laborers returned, not the areas of their 
short, seasonal employment, 
revolutionary sentiment. 23 
sufficient evidence was not 
proposition. 
became the 
In Nicaragua, 
sites of 
however, 
found to support this 
It would seem that Paige's theory is not particularly 
useful in explaining the sites of revolution within 
Nicaragua. At first glance the Pacific zone would have 
seemed the area where the FSLN should have received their 
greatest support. After considering the larger pattern 
in Nicaragua we find that the possibility exists that 
migratory laborers who were inhabitants of the Central 
Highlands were forced to migrate to the Pacific zone for 
seasonal employment and then return to unemployment in 
the Highlands after the harvest. As noted above, this 
proposition was not proven and requires further 
investigation. It is, however, important to note that in 
a recent articie on Guatemala, Paige argues that 
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migratory labor has the same radical implications as 
sharecropping, and that a change from hacienda to a 
migratory labor estate system creates the conditions for 
revolution. 24 
A Further Evaluation of Paige's Theory 
To evaluate Paige-'s theory it is important to begin 
with his main premise that a combination of 
noncultivators dependent on income from land and 
cultivators dependent on income from wages leads to 
revolution. In Nicaragua we find that these conditions 
were typical of t.;,he cotton expansion. The cotton 
producers required more land for cotton and a seasonal 
labor force. The hacienda system was not practical in 
this new cash crop economy. 
Paiges' theory also suggests that this type of land 
tenure system is predominant where cash crops are labor 
intensive. Nicaragua's cotton expansion provides 
evidence that capital intensive technology of a limited 
nature (mechanized pickers) can lead to limited 
employment opportunities for the laborers and actually 
increases exploitation. As Rodolfo Quiros-Guardia notes, 
capital intensity has diminished the relative 
need for permanent labor, the correlative 
increase in yields and the as yet limited 
mechanization of most harvesting operations has 
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intensified the need for seasonal labor. This 
change decreases employment security for large 
numbers in the rural labor force. Moreover, 
since capital intensit~;l constitutes both a 
barrier to entry and a competitive requirement, 
firms lacking resources t.o innovate and 
increase the scale of operations are likely to 
disappear or be forced to accept lower income 
levels. Thus, further concentration and 
polarization may be one of the outcomes of this 
process. 25 
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This warns against any overly-simplistic application of 
Paige's theory. Revolution may be more likely in an 
agrarian system in which the elite is dependent on land 
rather than capital, but this does not mean that 
infusions of capital into the production process reduce 
the likelihood of revolution, at least in the initial 
stages. The transition to more capital based 
agriculture may involve conditions that exacerbate worker 
discontent and enhance the prospects of revolution. 
A last factor to consider in evaluating Paige's theory 
is his emphasis on sharecropping or migratory labor 
estates as being the only two forms of land tenure which 
will lead to revolution. Since Nicaragua supports 
Paige's example of migratory labor estates, I will 
consider this more closely. First, it must be noted that 
Paige is not alone in his theory that the migratory labor 
estate system is truly exploitive. As Winson notes, the 
character of this new mobile labor force is different 
from the migratory rural population which depended on 
subsistence production in the past. This is why 
revolution is possible in such systems. They are 
characterized by the "accelerated employment of machinery 
and technical inputs and the seasonalization of the labor 
process ... 26 Furthermore "the net result of these events 
has been the expropriation 
semi-proletarianized 'colonos' 
them onto the burgeoning rural 
"this process bas introduced 
of peasants and 
from the land, throwing 
labor market ... 27 Lastly 
a marked degree of 
impermanence into the labor process and thus an important 
element of transciency into the regimen of the 
agricultural labor force ... 28 
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Paige~s Theory: An Alternative for Policymakers To Consider 
On the basis of the Nicaraguan and Honduran evidence, 
it seems relatively clear that Paige's theory contributes 
to an explanation of revolutionary change in Central 
America. This leads to the question of whether 
policymakers have learned from Paige's theory (now more 
than a decade old) in their quest to end revolutions in 
the Third World. As the Reagan administration continues 
to use military alternatives in an effort to halt 
revolutionary regimes such as Nicaragua's, it would seem 
that policymakers ignore Paige" s contention that local 
exploitive 
revolutionary 
conditions 
change. 
are 
This 
the major source of 
is unfortunate because 
Paige's theory demonstrates th.at agrarian revolut.ion 
results from economic structures where sharecropping and 
migratory labor estate systems are found and exploitation 
is predominant. The peasantry supports revolutionary 
change only when t.he problems of landlessness, 
unemployment and poverty are acute and the upper class is 
unwilling to bargain with the lower class and meet the 
pressures for reform and change in order to alleviate the 
existing conditions. 
In terms of the future one can only surmise that 
military interventions will cease when policymakers take 
a more realistic view of the dynamics of revolution. If 
they put to rest the notion that socialism is spread 
solely by outside intervention, and if they begin to 
evaluate alternative theories such as Paige's they may 
begin to see ways to promote and develop agrarian 
structures which are less exploitive, and less prone to 
violent resistance, than those based on sharecropping and 
migratory labor. 
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